Delegating Powers in the European Community

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 269-293

  Franchino, Fabio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842783942     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123404000055     Document Type: Article

References (116)

1. I use the term European Community because the empirical part of the article focuses only on the EC pillar of the Treaty on European Union.
2. A non-exhaustive list of relevant works includes Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 588-611; Morris P. Fiorina, 'Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1986), 33-51; Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 801-28.
3. A non-exhaustive list of relevant works includes Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 588-611; Morris P. Fiorina, 'Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1986), 33-51; Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 801-28.
4. A non-exhaustive list of relevant works includes Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 588-611; Morris P. Fiorina, 'Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1986), 33-51; Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 801-28.
5. A non-exhaustive list of relevant works includes Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 588-611; Morris P. Fiorina, 'Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1986), 33-51; Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 801-28.
6. A non-exhaustive list of relevant works includes Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, 'A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 588-611; Morris P. Fiorina, 'Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1986), 33-51; Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 801-28.
7. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 129-39, 197-219. Their model has been recently extended by Craig Volden, 'A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), 111-33.
8. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 129-39, 197-219. Their model has been recently extended by Craig Volden, 'A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), 111-33.
9. They also note the paucity of theoretical development and systematic empirical testing in the comparative literature, John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 27-32. Notable exceptions related to bureaucratic delegation are John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 18-33; Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994), 171-95; Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, 'The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe', Special Issue of West European Politics, 25 (2002).
10. They also note the paucity of theoretical development and systematic empirical testing in the comparative literature, John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 27-32. Notable exceptions related to bureaucratic delegation are John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 18-33; Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994), 171-95; Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, 'The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe', Special Issue of West European Politics, 25 (2002).
11. They also note the paucity of theoretical development and systematic empirical testing in the comparative literature, John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 27-32. Notable exceptions related to bureaucratic delegation are John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 18-33; Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994), 171-95; Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, 'The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe', Special Issue of West European Politics, 25 (2002).
12. They also note the paucity of theoretical development and systematic empirical testing in the comparative literature, John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 27-32. Notable exceptions related to bureaucratic delegation are John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 18-33; Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994), 171-95; Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, 'The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe', Special Issue of West European Politics, 25 (2002).
13. They also note the paucity of theoretical development and systematic empirical testing in the comparative literature, John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 27-32. Notable exceptions related to bureaucratic delegation are John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 18-33; Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1994), 171-95; Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, 'The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe', Special Issue of West European Politics, 25 (2002).
14. Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? pp. 103-6, 146-70.
15. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 235-46. Also internal cohesion of collective veto players generates high policy stability (pp. 2-5).
16. Alexander Ballmann, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 551-74; Francesca Bignami, "The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States', Jean Monnet Working Paper, 5/99 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1999); Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21-98; Koen Lenaerts, 'Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community', Common Market Law Review, 28 (1991), 11-35.
17. Alexander Ballmann, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 551-74; Francesca Bignami, "The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States', Jean Monnet Working Paper, 5/99 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1999); Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21-98; Koen Lenaerts, 'Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community', Common Market Law Review, 28 (1991), 11-35.
18. Alexander Ballmann, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 551-74; Francesca Bignami, "The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States', Jean Monnet Working Paper, 5/99 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1999); Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21-98; Koen Lenaerts, 'Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community', Common Market Law Review, 28 (1991), 11-35.
19. Alexander Ballmann, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 551-74; Francesca Bignami, "The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States', Jean Monnet Working Paper, 5/99 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1999); Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21-98; Koen Lenaerts, 'Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community', Common Market Law Review, 28 (1991), 11-35.
20. Mark A. Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International Organization, 51 (1997), 99-134. See also Mark A. Pollack, 'The Commission as an Agent' in Neill Nugent, ed., At the Mean of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 109-28. Works on control mechanisms that explicitly refer to agency theory include Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Fabio Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 59-88; Jonas Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and with What Consequences?' West European Politics, 25 (2002), 23-46.
21. Mark A. Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International Organization, 51 (1997), 99-134. See also Mark A. Pollack, 'The Commission as an Agent' in Neill Nugent, ed., At the Mean of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 109-28. Works on control mechanisms that explicitly refer to agency theory include Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Fabio Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 59-88; Jonas Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and with What Consequences?' West European Politics, 25 (2002), 23-46.
22. Mark A. Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International Organization, 51 (1997), 99-134. See also Mark A. Pollack, 'The Commission as an Agent' in Neill Nugent, ed., At the Mean of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 109-28. Works on control mechanisms that explicitly refer to agency theory include Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Fabio Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 59-88; Jonas Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and with What Consequences?' West European Politics, 25 (2002), 23-46.
23. Mark A. Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International Organization, 51 (1997), 99-134. See also Mark A. Pollack, 'The Commission as an Agent' in Neill Nugent, ed., At the Mean of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 109-28. Works on control mechanisms that explicitly refer to agency theory include Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Fabio Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 59-88; Jonas Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and with What Consequences?' West European Politics, 25 (2002), 23-46.
24. Mark A. Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International Organization, 51 (1997), 99-134. See also Mark A. Pollack, 'The Commission as an Agent' in Neill Nugent, ed., At the Mean of the Union: Studies of the European Commission (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 109-28. Works on control mechanisms that explicitly refer to agency theory include Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Fabio Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 59-88; Jonas Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and with What Consequences?' West European Politics, 25 (2002), 23-46.
25. Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance', European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22; Giandomenico Majone, 'The European Commission: the Limits of Centralisation, the Perils of Parliamentarisation', Governance, 15 (2002), 375-92.
26. Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance', European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22; Giandomenico Majone, 'The European Commission: the Limits of Centralisation, the Perils of Parliamentarisation', Governance, 15 (2002), 375-92.
27. Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance', European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22; Giandomenico Majone, 'The European Commission: the Limits of Centralisation, the Perils of Parliamentarisation', Governance, 15 (2002), 375-92.
28. Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance', European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22; Giandomenico Majone, 'The European Commission: the Limits of Centralisation, the Perils of Parliamentarisation', Governance, 15 (2002), 375-92.
29. Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions', pp. 25-8. Delegation for technocratic reasons is the neofunctionalist argument of European integration studies; see, for instance, Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); Ernst B. Haas 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in Stephen R. Graubard, A New Europe? (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 65-85.
30. Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions', pp. 25-8. Delegation for technocratic reasons is the neofunctionalist argument of European integration studies; see, for instance, Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); Ernst B. Haas 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in Stephen R. Graubard, A New Europe? (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 65-85.
31. Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions', pp. 25-8. Delegation for technocratic reasons is the neofunctionalist argument of European integration studies; see, for instance, Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); Ernst B. Haas 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in Stephen R. Graubard, A New Europe? (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 65-85.
32. A non-exhaustive list of case studies on the Commission that refer to agency and delegation theory includes Sophie Meunier, 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', International Organization, 54 (2000), 103-35; Mark A. Pollack, 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-49; Susanne K. Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power over the Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 37-61; Stephan Stetter, 'Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 80-103; Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 558-84; Jonas Tallberg, 'The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (2000), 843-64.
33. A non-exhaustive list of case studies on the Commission that refer to agency and delegation theory includes Sophie Meunier, 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', International Organization, 54 (2000), 103-35; Mark A. Pollack, 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-49; Susanne K. Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power over the Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 37-61; Stephan Stetter, 'Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 80-103; Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 558-84; Jonas Tallberg, 'The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (2000), 843-64.
34. A non-exhaustive list of case studies on the Commission that refer to agency and delegation theory includes Sophie Meunier, 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', International Organization, 54 (2000), 103-35; Mark A. Pollack, 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-49; Susanne K. Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power over the Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 37-61; Stephan Stetter, 'Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 80-103; Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 558-84; Jonas Tallberg, 'The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (2000), 843-64.
35. A non-exhaustive list of case studies on the Commission that refer to agency and delegation theory includes Sophie Meunier, 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', International Organization, 54 (2000), 103-35; Mark A. Pollack, 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-49; Susanne K. Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power over the Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 37-61; Stephan Stetter, 'Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 80-103; Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 558-84; Jonas Tallberg, 'The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (2000), 843-64.
36. A non-exhaustive list of case studies on the Commission that refer to agency and delegation theory includes Sophie Meunier, 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', International Organization, 54 (2000), 103-35; Mark A. Pollack, 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-49; Susanne K. Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power over the Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 37-61; Stephan Stetter, 'Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 80-103; Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 558-84; Jonas Tallberg, 'The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (2000), 843-64.
37. A non-exhaustive list of case studies on the Commission that refer to agency and delegation theory includes Sophie Meunier, 'What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations', International Organization, 54 (2000), 103-35; Mark A. Pollack, 'The Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-49; Susanne K. Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power over the Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 37-61; Stephan Stetter, 'Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 80-103; Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 558-84; Jonas Tallberg, 'The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (2000), 843-64.
38. On this point, see also Fabio Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West European Politics, 24 (2001), 169-92; Jonas Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 104-21; Jonas Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 609-43. The selection of mechanisms that allow flexible national implementation is frequently considered in cases studies on Council negotiations, see, e.g., Rainer Eising, 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', International Organization, 56 (2002), 85-120; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds, The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). For a recent model, see Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, 'The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?' European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 201-26.
39. On this point, see also Fabio Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West European Politics, 24 (2001), 169-92; Jonas Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 104-21; Jonas Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 609-43. The selection of mechanisms that allow flexible national implementation is frequently considered in cases studies on Council negotiations, see, e.g., Rainer Eising, 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', International Organization, 56 (2002), 85-120; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds, The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). For a recent model, see Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, 'The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?' European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 201-26.
40. On this point, see also Fabio Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West European Politics, 24 (2001), 169-92; Jonas Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 104-21; Jonas Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 609-43. The selection of mechanisms that allow flexible national implementation is frequently considered in cases studies on Council negotiations, see, e.g., Rainer Eising, 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', International Organization, 56 (2002), 85-120; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds, The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). For a recent model, see Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, 'The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?' European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 201-26.
41. On this point, see also Fabio Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West European Politics, 24 (2001), 169-92; Jonas Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 104-21; Jonas Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 609-43. The selection of mechanisms that allow flexible national implementation is frequently considered in cases studies on Council negotiations, see, e.g., Rainer Eising, 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', International Organization, 56 (2002), 85-120; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds, The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). For a recent model, see Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, 'The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?' European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 201-26.
42. On this point, see also Fabio Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West European Politics, 24 (2001), 169-92; Jonas Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 104-21; Jonas Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 609-43. The selection of mechanisms that allow flexible national implementation is frequently considered in cases studies on Council negotiations, see, e.g., Rainer Eising, 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', International Organization, 56 (2002), 85-120; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds, The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). For a recent model, see Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, 'The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?' European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 201-26.
43. On this point, see also Fabio Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West European Politics, 24 (2001), 169-92; Jonas Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability', Journal of European Public Policy, 1 (2000), 104-21; Jonas Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union', International Organization, 56 (2002), 609-43. The selection of mechanisms that allow flexible national implementation is frequently considered in cases studies on Council negotiations, see, e.g., Rainer Eising, 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', International Organization, 56 (2002), 85-120; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds, The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999). For a recent model, see Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg, 'The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union: An Impossible Quest?' European Union Politics, 1 (2000), 201-26.
44. Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions', pp. 26-7.
45. A few case studies have tried to identify the conditions for Commission influence; see the review by Mark A. Pollack, 'Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation', West European Politics, 25 (2002), 200-19, p. 212. Two formal works, based on the veto player argument, have produced propositions on the Commission's discretion that relate indirectly to this work. They will be discussed in detail in the conclusion, see Jenna Bednar, John Ferejohn and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of European Federalism', International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (1996), 279-94; George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union', International Organization, 55 (2001), 357-90.
46. A few case studies have tried to identify the conditions for Commission influence; see the review by Mark A. Pollack, 'Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation', West European Politics, 25 (2002), 200-19, p. 212. Two formal works, based on the veto player argument, have produced propositions on the Commission's discretion that relate indirectly to this work. They will be discussed in detail in the conclusion, see Jenna Bednar, John Ferejohn and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of European Federalism', International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (1996), 279-94; George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union', International Organization, 55 (2001), 357-90.
47. A few case studies have tried to identify the conditions for Commission influence; see the review by Mark A. Pollack, 'Learning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation', West European Politics, 25 (2002), 200-19, p. 212. Two formal works, based on the veto player argument, have produced propositions on the Commission's discretion that relate indirectly to this work. They will be discussed in detail in the conclusion, see Jenna Bednar, John Ferejohn and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of European Federalism', International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (1996), 279-94; George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union', International Organization, 55 (2001), 357-90.
48. Epstein and O'Halloran have analysed delegation to independent agencies in Delegating Powers, pp. 154-61; see also Volden, 'A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System'.
49. Epstein and O'Halloran have analysed delegation to independent agencies in Delegating Powers, pp. 154-61; see also Volden, 'A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System'.
50. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast, 'Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies', Virginia Law Review, 75 (1989), 431-82; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast, 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3 (1987), 243-77.
51. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast, 'Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies', Virginia Law Review, 75 (1989), 431-82; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast, 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3 (1987), 243-77.
52. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 26, 74-5.
53. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 75, 79.
54. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1991); Mathew D. McCubbins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-48.
55. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1991); Mathew D. McCubbins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-48.
56. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 75, 85.
57. This procedure is called consultation when the European Parliament issues a non-binding opinion that does not affect outcomes. Since the European Parliament can be consulted when either unanimity or majority voting is used, I only refer to the decision rule of the Council. Finally, for completeness, the Council can amend the Commission's proposal by unanimity when majority voting applies.
58. This argument is coherent with Moravcsik's view that qualified majority voting is a means to commit governments to specific policy objectives: Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 73-7, 485-9. My propositions show how decision rules operate as a technology of commitment. Credibility is achieved in areas under qualified majority voting by restricting national executive action and by granting greater discretion to a supranational bureaucracy. For a formal proof, see Fabio Franchino, 'A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union' (paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Mass., 2002).
59. This argument is coherent with Moravcsik's view that qualified majority voting is a means to commit governments to specific policy objectives: Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 73-7, 485-9. My propositions show how decision rules operate as a technology of commitment. Credibility is achieved in areas under qualified majority voting by restricting national executive action and by granting greater discretion to a supranational bureaucracy. For a formal proof, see Fabio Franchino, 'A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union' (paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Mass., 2002).
60. Fabio Franchino, 'The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(2000), 155-81.
61. Christophe Crombez, 'Legislative Procedures in the European Community', British Journal of Political Science, 26 (1996), 199-228.
62. The Court too makes strategic calculations in its decision making and its pro-integration preferences may increase the Commission's leeway in implementation. However, the Court cannot disregard, without losing credibility, its Treaty role of upholding EC law when the Commission's acts are ultra vires, especially where the Council's mandate is clear, see, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union', International Organization, 52 (1998), 149-76; Karen J. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice', International Organization, 52 (1998), 121-47. Further, I am aware of only a handful of cases of successful Commission-Court co-operation, see, e.g., Simon Bulmer, 'Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merger Control', Public Administration, 72 (1994), 431-2; Wayne Sandholtz, 'The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunication Regime', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 153-60; Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter?'
63. The Court too makes strategic calculations in its decision making and its pro-integration preferences may increase the Commission's leeway in implementation. However, the Court cannot disregard, without losing credibility, its Treaty role of upholding EC law when the Commission's acts are ultra vires, especially where the Council's mandate is clear, see, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union', International Organization, 52 (1998), 149-76; Karen J. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice', International Organization, 52 (1998), 121-47. Further, I am aware of only a handful of cases of successful Commission-Court co-operation, see, e.g., Simon Bulmer, 'Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merger Control', Public Administration, 72 (1994), 431-2; Wayne Sandholtz, 'The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunication Regime', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 153-60; Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter?'
64. The Court too makes strategic calculations in its decision making and its pro-integration preferences may increase the Commission's leeway in implementation. However, the Court cannot disregard, without losing credibility, its Treaty role of upholding EC law when the Commission's acts are ultra vires, especially where the Council's mandate is clear, see, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union', International Organization, 52 (1998), 149-76; Karen J. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice', International Organization, 52 (1998), 121-47. Further, I am aware of only a handful of cases of successful Commission-Court co-operation, see, e.g., Simon Bulmer, 'Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merger Control', Public Administration, 72 (1994), 431-2; Wayne Sandholtz, 'The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunication Regime', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 153-60; Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter?'
65. The Court too makes strategic calculations in its decision making and its pro-integration preferences may increase the Commission's leeway in implementation. However, the Court cannot disregard, without losing credibility, its Treaty role of upholding EC law when the Commission's acts are ultra vires, especially where the Council's mandate is clear, see, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union', International Organization, 52 (1998), 149-76; Karen J. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice', International Organization, 52 (1998), 121-47. Further, I am aware of only a handful of cases of successful Commission-Court co-operation, see, e.g., Simon Bulmer, 'Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merger Control', Public Administration, 72 (1994), 431-2; Wayne Sandholtz, 'The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunication Regime', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 153-60; Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter?'
66. The Court too makes strategic calculations in its decision making and its pro-integration preferences may increase the Commission's leeway in implementation. However, the Court cannot disregard, without losing credibility, its Treaty role of upholding EC law when the Commission's acts are ultra vires, especially where the Council's mandate is clear, see, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz, 'The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union', International Organization, 52 (1998), 149-76; Karen J. Alter, 'Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice', International Organization, 52 (1998), 121-47. Further, I am aware of only a handful of cases of successful Commission-Court co-operation, see, e.g., Simon Bulmer, 'Institutions and Policy Change in the European Communities: The Case of Merger Control', Public Administration, 72 (1994), 431-2; Wayne Sandholtz, 'The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunication Regime', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds, European Integration and Supranational Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 153-60; Schmidt, 'Only an Agenda Setter?'
67. Franchino, 'The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology', p. 161.
68. Franchino, 'The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology', pp. 164-6.
69. This is proposition 1.1 in Franchino, 'The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology', p. 164. However, three qualifications are needed. First, the proposition refers to the assent procedure rather than to unanimity. This procedure requires unanimity in the Council and the approval of the European Parliament (EP) under a closed rule. Nevertheless, the hypothesis is unaffected because, under assent, the EP can only reduce the discretion that would have been otherwise conferred by a unanimous Council. Moreover, no acts in the sample are adopted using this procedure, Secondly, the hypothesis is unaffected also for the thirteen acts adopted in co-operation with the EP. This procedure gives the EP the power to propose amendments that, if accepted by the Commission, the Council adopts by qualified majority voting or rejects unanimously. The EP can reduce the discretion that would have been otherwise conferred by the Council under qualified majority voting. But, it will not be smaller than the discretion conferred by a unanimous Council. Thirdly, because of the Commission's power to propose, proposition 1.1 limits the impact of the decision rules on discretion to cases where the status quo discretion is null or small. This applies to more than 88 per cent of the acts in the sample (140 laws) because this legislation either does not amend previous acts or amends acts where no powers were delegated to the Commission. The amendments in two of the remaining cases are of minor importance (Directive 63/21 and Regulation 355/77). They amend only one paragraph, with no implication for the Commission, they legislate on new issues and they can be treated as cases where the status quo discretion is null. In sixteen other cases, the act repeals previous legislation entirely, thus powers are delegated ex novo. They also can be treated as acts with no status quo discretion. This consideration applies also to proposition 2.1.
70. This is proposition 2.1 in Franchino, 'The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology', p. 165.
71. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans N. Stokman, eds, European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); Gerald Schneider and Stefanie Bailer, 'The Winners and Losers of European Integration: An Empirical Evaluation of Competing Bargaining Models' (paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001). For an unsuccessful attempt, see Fabio Franchino, 'Statutory Discretion and Procedural Control of the European Commission's Executive Functions', Journal of Legislative Studies, 6 (2000), 28-50.
72. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans N. Stokman, eds, European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); Gerald Schneider and Stefanie Bailer, 'The Winners and Losers of European Integration: An Empirical Evaluation of Competing Bargaining Models' (paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001). For an unsuccessful attempt, see Fabio Franchino, 'Statutory Discretion and Procedural Control of the European Commission's Executive Functions', Journal of Legislative Studies, 6 (2000), 28-50.
73. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans N. Stokman, eds, European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); Gerald Schneider and Stefanie Bailer, 'The Winners and Losers of European Integration: An Empirical Evaluation of Competing Bargaining Models' (paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001). For an unsuccessful attempt, see Fabio Franchino, 'Statutory Discretion and Procedural Control of the European Commission's Executive Functions', Journal of Legislative Studies, 6 (2000), 28-50.
74. See Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Jonathan Golub, 'In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community', International Organization, 53 (1999), 733-64, pp. 752; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 474-5, 486-7.
75. See Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Jonathan Golub, 'In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community', International Organization, 53 (1999), 733-64, pp. 752; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 474-5, 486-7.
76. See Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Jonathan Golub, 'In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community', International Organization, 53 (1999), 733-64, pp. 752; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 474-5, 486-7.
77. Clifford J. Carrubba and Craig Volden, 'Explaining Institutional Change in the European Union: What Determines the Voting Rule in the Council of Ministers?' European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 5-30.
78. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 332-43.
79. These qualifications do not change the basic thrust of the argument because shifts in substantive preferences predate the choice of commitment technologies and issue-linkages seldom occur; see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 473-89.
80. The Committee of Permanent Representatives is the main organ of the Council administration. It is mostly staffed by senior civil servants from national ministries. They are therefore under the control of the relevant minister. A small Council Secretariat performs administrative duties for the whole Council. See Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 70-133.
81. Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 63.
82. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, p. 30.
83. See proposition 2.1 in Franchino, 'The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology', p. 165.
84. David Spence 'Staff and Personnel Policy in the Commission' in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds, The European Commission (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1994), pp. 62-94, at pp. 65-8; Anne Stevens and Handley Stevens, Brussels Bureaucrats? (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 122-5; Neill Nugent, The European Commission (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 162-85.
85. David Spence 'Staff and Personnel Policy in the Commission' in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds, The European Commission (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1994), pp. 62-94, at pp. 65-8; Anne Stevens and Handley Stevens, Brussels Bureaucrats? (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 122-5; Neill Nugent, The European Commission (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 162-85.
86. David Spence 'Staff and Personnel Policy in the Commission' in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds, The European Commission (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1994), pp. 62-94, at pp. 65-8; Anne Stevens and Handley Stevens, Brussels Bureaucrats? (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 122-5; Neill Nugent, The European Commission (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 162-85.
87. Tallberg, 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions', p. 27. Admittedly, delegation to the Commission might still use up some ministerial resources as
88. Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies'; Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement'; Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance'.
89. Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies'; Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement'; Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance'.
90. Franchino, 'Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies'; Tallberg, 'Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement'; Tallberg, 'Paths to Compliance'.
91. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991).
92. Additional information on the procedure can be found at the website address listed in the acknowledgement.
93. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 90-112.
94. A more detailed explanation is to be found in the Appendix to the website version of this article.
95. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 197-200.
96. Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization.
97. Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions'; Franchino, 'Statutory Discretion and Procedural Control of the Commission's Executive Functions'.
98. Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions'; Franchino, 'Statutory Discretion and Procedural Control of the Commission's Executive Functions'.
99. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 211-16.
100. Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Hix, The Political System of the European Union, pp. 41-5; Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', pp. 114-16.
101. Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Hix, The Political System of the European Union, pp. 41-5; Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', pp. 114-16.
102. Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Hix, The Political System of the European Union, pp. 41-5; Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', pp. 114-16.
103. Ballmann, Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Delegation, Comitology and the Separation of Powers in the European Union'; Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions', pp. 76-7; Hix, The Political System of the European Union, pp. 41-5; Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', pp. 114-16.
104. Several diagnostics have been performed on the data. The t-statistics have been computed using White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and there is no evidence of collinearity. A Ramsey RESET test reveals that the coefficient of one fitted value is significantly different from 0 in Models 2 and 4, indicating a specification error. However, inspection of the partial residual and of the fitted-versus-residual plots does not reject a linear specification of the models and the independent variables are uncorrelated with the error terms. Further, there is no evidence of omitted variables and of other specification errors in Model 1 and, importantly, in the more general Model 3 and in the Commission and relative discretion models. Finally, the first two dependent variables may both be left censored at 0. As a final check, I have estimated normal Tobit regressions for the first five models. Results are confirmed, with minor changes. The significance of the programme variable decreases to 5 per cent in Model 1 while that of the decision variable in the Commission model increases to 1 per cent.
105. The shift from unanimity to majority voting has led to greater discretion, compared to prior legislation in the same area, in Directives 89/48 and 92/51 on the general system for the recognition of diplomas, in the second banking directive (Directive 89/646) and, probably, in Directive 88/378 on safety of toys.
106. Tsebelis and Garrett, 'The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union', p. 383. A similar point is made by Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett, 'The Politics of European Federalism', p. 284.
107. Tsebelis and Garrett, 'The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union', p. 383. A similar point is made by Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett, 'The Politics of European Federalism', p. 284.
108. Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? p. 229.
109. Tsebelis, Veto Players, p. 236.
110. Tsebelis, Veto Players, pp. 222-47.
111. Discretion, their dependent variable, is the number of new words inserted in an existing statute. This implies that the executive has already some policy prerogatives (Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? pp. 143-6).
112. Markus Haverland, 'National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points', Journal of Public Policy, 20 (2000), 83-103; Adrienne Héritier, ' "Leaders" and "Laggards" in European Clean Air Policy', in Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden, eds, Convergence or Diversity: Intenationalization and Economic Policy Response (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1995), pp. 278-306; Christoph Knill, 'European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions', Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1998), 1-28.
113. Markus Haverland, 'National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points', Journal of Public Policy, 20 (2000), 83-103; Adrienne Héritier, ' "Leaders" and "Laggards" in European Clean Air Policy', in Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden, eds, Convergence or Diversity: Intenationalization and Economic Policy Response (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1995), pp. 278-306; Christoph Knill, 'European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions', Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1998), 1-28.
114. Markus Haverland, 'National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points', Journal of Public Policy, 20 (2000), 83-103; Adrienne Héritier, ' "Leaders" and "Laggards" in European Clean Air Policy', in Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden, eds, Convergence or Diversity: Intenationalization and Economic Policy Response (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1995), pp. 278-306; Christoph Knill, 'European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions', Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1998), 1-28.
115. Cf. Kathleen Bawn, 'Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 13 (1997), 101-26
116. See Franchino, 'A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union'.