Does private information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining?

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 533-553

  Leventǒlu, Bahar ^a   Tarar, Ahmer ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRISIS MANAGEMENT; GAME THEORY; MODELING; STATE ROLE;

EID: 49349116164     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00514.x     Document Type: Article

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