-
1
-
-
21144447607
-
Obsolescence and Immanence in Criminal Law Theory
-
N. MacCormick and D. Garland, 'Sovereign States and Vengeful Victims' in Fundamentals of Sentencing Theories, eds. A. Ashworth and M. Wasik (1998) 11-30. Compare R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 180. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968). Ashworth, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 28-30. id., p. 35. This is in line with the argument that the criminal law should be used only as a last resort, even though Husak recently argued that the application of this last resort principle is unlikely to bring about sweeping changes in criminalization; see
-
M. Tonry Obsolescence and Immanence in Criminal Law Theory 2005) 105 Columbia Law Rev. 1233 75.
-
(2005)
Columbia Law Rev.
, vol.105
, pp. 1233-75
-
-
Tonry, M.1
-
2
-
-
85044009135
-
The Criminal Law as Last Resort
-
35. In German terminology they are referred to as 'Rechtsguter'. See the dissertation of K. Tiedemann, Tatbestandsfunktionen im Nebenstrafrecht (1969). For a more recent account, see R. Hefendehl, A. von Hirsch, and W. Wohlers. Die Rechtsgutstheorie (2004). See
-
D. Husak The Criminal Law as Last Resort 2004) 24 Oxford J. of Legal Studies, 207 35.
-
(2004)
Oxford J. of Legal Studies
, vol.24
, pp. 207
-
-
Husak, D.1
-
3
-
-
0346223275
-
Guauging Criminal Harms: A Living Standard Analysis
-
and. ff. See, for instance, G. Heine and V. Meinberg, Empfehlen sich Änderungen im straf rechtlichen Umweltschutz, insbesondere in Verbindung mit dem Verwaltungsrecht? Gutachten D für dem 57. Juristentag (1988). Ashworth, op. cit., n. 5, p. 41. See J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (1984). Ashworth, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 33-7. This can be found in the works of Dutch criminal legal scholars: L. Hulsman, Handhaving van Recht (1965); L. Hulsman, Afscheid van het Strafrecht. Een Pleidooi voor Zelfregulering (1986); Th. de Roos, Strafbaarstelling van Economische Delikten (1987), and others. Ashworth, op. cit., n. 5, p. 36. P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965). Ashworth, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 42-6; Allen, op. cit., n. 7, pp. 9-11. Allen, id., p. 9. See S. Jones, Criminology (2001, 2nd edn.) 30-3. There is a vast literature about criminalization constructed in terms of the contest between political, social, and economic forces that is beyond the scope of the present article. See
-
A. von Hirsch and N. Jarenborg Guauging Criminal Harms: a Living Standard Analysis 1991) 11 Oxford J. of Legal Studies, 1 ff.
-
(1991)
Oxford J. of Legal Studies
, vol.11
, pp. 1
-
-
Von Hirsch, A.1
Jarenborg, N.2
-
4
-
-
85053395780
-
The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement
-
for a general discussion. That is the objective of the literature on optimal law enforcement. Since the seminal paper by Becker, it has focused on the balance between probability and severity of punishment as means of achieving efficient law enforcement. The main contribution of this literature is to provide a theory of criminal behaviour and how criminals react to incentives. See
-
S. Shavell The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement 1993) 36 J. of Law and Economics 255 87
-
(1993)
J. of Law and Economics
, vol.36
, pp. 255-87
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
5
-
-
0000787258
-
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
-
Recent updated surveys include
-
G. Becker Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 1968) 76 J. of Political Economy 169 217.
-
(1968)
J. of Political Economy
, vol.76
, pp. 169-217
-
-
Becker, G.1
-
6
-
-
0012385754
-
The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement
-
;
-
N. Garoupa The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement 1997) 11 J. of Economic Surveys 267 96
-
(1997)
J. of Economic Surveys
, vol.11
, pp. 267-96
-
-
Garoupa, N.1
-
7
-
-
0001861227
-
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
-
and. ; and A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, 'Public Enforcement of Law including Criminal Law' in Handbook of Law and Economics, eds. A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (2007) 403-54. As to the empirical support for the deterrence hypothesis, see S. Levitt and T. Miles, 'Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment' in Polinsky and Shavell, id., 455-96. See, also, F. Drago, R. Galbiati, and P. Vertova, 'The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment', CEPR Working Paper 6401 (2007).
-
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law 2000) 38 J. of Economic Literature 45 76
-
(2000)
J. of Economic Literature
, vol.38
, pp. 45-76
-
-
Polinsky, A.M.1
Shavell, S.2
-
8
-
-
77955254791
-
An Economic Theory of Criminal Law
-
Further work by Richard Posner on crime includes
-
R. Posner An Economic Theory of Criminal Law 1985) 85 Columbia Law Rev. 1193 231.
-
(1985)
Columbia Law Rev.
, vol.85
, pp. 1193-231
-
-
Posner, R.1
-
10
-
-
0002071502
-
The Problem of Social Cost
-
and
-
R. Coase The Problem of Social Cost 1960) 3 J. of Law and Economics 1 44
-
(1960)
J. of Law and Economics
, vol.3
, pp. 1-44
-
-
Coase, R.1
-
11
-
-
0001609162
-
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
-
and. See
-
G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral 1972) 85 Harvard Law Rev. 1089 128.
-
(1972)
Harvard Law Rev.
, vol.85
, pp. 1089-128
-
-
Calabresi, G.1
Melamed, A.D.2
-
12
-
-
84935322680
-
Prices and Sanctions
-
on fines not being prices. We note however that imprisonment has not always been a sanction preserved exclusively, or even principally, for matters today regarded as crimes. Charles Dickens's father, John, for example, spent time in a debtors' prison. See
-
R. Cooter Prices and Sanctions 1984) 84 Columbia Law Rev. 1523 60
-
(1984)
Columbia Law Rev.
, vol.84
, pp. 1523-60
-
-
Cooter, R.1
-
13
-
-
0030529813
-
The Tort/Crime Distinction a Generation Later
-
See
-
R. Epstein The Tort/Crime Distinction a Generation Later 1996) 76 Boston University Law Rev. 1 21.
-
(1996)
Boston University Law Rev.
, vol.76
, pp. 1-21
-
-
Epstein, R.1
-
14
-
-
0001418084
-
Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety
-
and
-
S. Shavell Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety 1984) 13 J. of Legal Studies 357 74.
-
(1984)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.13
, pp. 357-74
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
15
-
-
0000447575
-
A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation
-
See T. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law (2004) ch. 9. See, also, Posner, and Philipson and Posner, op. cit., n. 32, on providing an economic justification for the use of intent in criminal law. We depart from Posner's original argument by taking a sceptical tone concerning his economic explanation of intent. We take the view that the reciprocity argument is more promising. In case of these regulatory offences, many legal systems often merely require that the perpetrator knowingly violated the law and that no grounds of excuse or justification are available. See
-
S. Shavell A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 1984) 15 Rand J. of Economics 271 80.
-
(1984)
Rand J. of Economics
, vol.15
, pp. 271-80
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
17
-
-
0346613498
-
The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal System
-
On optimal precaution by victims, see
-
S. Shavell The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal System 1997) 26 J. of Legal Studies 575 612.
-
(1997)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.26
, pp. 575-612
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
18
-
-
33748574099
-
Optimal Law Enforcement when Victims are Rational Players
-
Shavell, op. cit., n. 30. id. See discussion by
-
N. Garoupa Optimal Law Enforcement when Victims are Rational Players 2001) 2 Economics of Governance 231 42.
-
(2001)
Economics of Governance
, vol.2
, pp. 231-42
-
-
Garoupa, N.1
-
19
-
-
0003375133
-
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
-
and. ;
-
G. Becker and G. J. Stigler Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers 1974) 3 J. of Legal Studies 1 18
-
(1974)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.3
, pp. 1-18
-
-
Becker, G.1
Stigler, G.J.2
-
20
-
-
49349097628
-
The Private Enforcement of Law
-
and. ;
-
W. M. Landes and R. Posner The Private Enforcement of Law 1975) 9 J. of Legal Studies 105 27
-
(1975)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.9
, pp. 105-27
-
-
Landes, W.M.1
Posner, R.2
-
21
-
-
0039786066
-
Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law
-
97 ; also
-
D. D. Friedman Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law 1984) 13 J. of Legal Studies 379 97
-
(1984)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.13
, pp. 379
-
-
Friedman, D.D.1
-
22
-
-
0010950913
-
Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines
-
;
-
A. M. Polinsky Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines 1980) 9 J. of Legal Studies 105 27
-
(1980)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.9
, pp. 105-27
-
-
Polinsky, A.M.1
-
23
-
-
34547171013
-
A Note on Private Enforcement and Type I Error
-
; and
-
N. Garoupa A Note on Private Enforcement and Type I Error 1997) 17 International Rev. of Law and Economics 423 9
-
(1997)
International Rev. of Law and Economics
, vol.17
, pp. 423-9
-
-
Garoupa, N.1
-
24
-
-
3242703530
-
Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government
-
and. 40. Shavell, op. cit., n. 30. See, for example
-
N. Garoupa and D. Klerman Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government 2002) 4 Am. Law and Economics Rev. 116 40.
-
(2002)
Am. Law and Economics Rev.
, vol.4
, pp. 116
-
-
Garoupa, N.1
Klerman, D.2
-
25
-
-
0347684362
-
A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law
-
729. or
-
R. McAdams A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law 1996) 86 Virginia Law Rev. 1649 729.
-
(1996)
Virginia Law Rev.
, vol.86
, pp. 1649
-
-
McAdams, R.1
-
26
-
-
17444366180
-
Words that Kill? Economic Perspectives on Hate Speech and Hate Crime
-
and. 136.
-
D. Dharmapala and R. McAdams Words that Kill? Economic Perspectives on Hate Speech and Hate Crime 2005) 34 J. of Legal Studies 93 136.
-
(2005)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.34
, pp. 93
-
-
Dharmapala, D.1
McAdams, R.2
-
27
-
-
0033390119
-
Why not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment
-
;
-
D. Friedman Why not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment 1999) 107 J. of Political Economy 259 69
-
(1999)
J. of Political Economy
, vol.107
, pp. 259-69
-
-
Friedman, D.1
-
28
-
-
0030527436
-
Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law
-
57, and
-
J. Lindgren Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law 1996) 76 University of Boston Law Rev. 29 57
-
(1996)
University of Boston Law Rev.
, vol.76
, pp. 29
-
-
Lindgren, J.1
-
30
-
-
0002800105
-
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
-
and. Shavell, op. cit., n. 30. This point has also been made by G. Skogh, 'A Note on Gary Beckers' Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' (1973) Swedish J. of Economics 305-11, and G. Skogh and C. Stuart 'An Economic Analysis of Crime Rates, Punishment and the Social Consequences of Crime' (1982) Public Choice 171-9. See
-
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment 1984) 24 J. of Public Economics 89 99.
-
(1984)
J. of Public Economics
, vol.24
, pp. 89-99
-
-
Polinsky, A.M.1
Shavell, S.2
-
32
-
-
27744568959
-
Forfeiture of Illegal Gain: An Economic Perspective
-
and. In unilateral acts, if the victim is also able to reduce the probability of harm, then some under-compensation might be optimal to solve the moral hazard problem. There is nevertheless a trade-off since under-compensation of victims also reduces injurers' incentives. See M. Faure, 'Compensation of Non-Pecuniary Loss: An Economic Perspective' in European TortLaw, Liber Amicorum for Helmut Koziol, eds. U. Magnus and J. Spier (2000) 143-59. Cooter, op. cit., n. 34. R.D. Cooter, 'Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages' (1982) Southern California Law Rev. 97-101, and see
-
R. Bowles, M. Faure, and N. Garoupa Forfeiture of Illegal Gain: An Economic Perspective 2005) 25 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 275 95.
-
(2005)
Oxford J. of Legal Studies
, vol.25
, pp. 275-95
-
-
Bowles, R.1
Faure, M.2
Garoupa, N.3
-
33
-
-
0001428253
-
Criminal Procedure as a Market System
-
See, further, on the economic analysis of criminal procedure
-
F. Easterbrook Criminal Procedure as a Market System 1983) 12 J. of Legal Studies 289 332.
-
(1983)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.12
, pp. 289-332
-
-
Easterbrook, F.1
-
34
-
-
0041683522
-
Note: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Proceedings in Civil Law Countries
-
and
-
C. Y. Chu Note: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Proceedings in Civil Law Countries 1991) 11 International Rev. of Law and Economics 111 16
-
(1991)
International Rev. of Law and Economics
, vol.11
, pp. 111-16
-
-
Chu, C.Y.1
-
35
-
-
0012805458
-
Optimal Criminal Procedure: Fairness and Deterrence
-
See
-
T. Miceli Optimal Criminal Procedure: Fairness and Deterrence 1991) 11 International Rev. of Law and Economics 3 10.
-
(1991)
International Rev. of Law and Economics
, vol.11
, pp. 3-10
-
-
Miceli, T.1
-
36
-
-
0030526079
-
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert
-
See
-
P. Robinson The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert 1996) 76 Boston University Law Rev. 201 14.
-
(1996)
Boston University Law Rev.
, vol.76
, pp. 201-14
-
-
Robinson, P.1
-
37
-
-
33745723793
-
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis
-
and
-
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis 1998) 111 Harvard Law Rev. 869 962.
-
(1998)
Harvard Law Rev.
, vol.111
, pp. 869-962
-
-
Polinsky, A.M.1
Shavell, S.2
-
38
-
-
0030527802
-
The Distinction between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law
-
D. J. Seipp The Distinction between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law 1996) 76 Boston University Law Rev. 59 87.
-
(1996)
Boston University Law Rev.
, vol.76
, pp. 59-87
-
-
Seipp, D.J.1
-
39
-
-
0043232434
-
Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction
-
12. In addition to the well-known work of Shavell (op. cit., n. 37) in this respect we can also point, among others, to
-
D. Friedman Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction 1996) 76 Boston University Law Rev. 103 12.
-
(1996)
Boston University Law Rev.
, vol.76
, pp. 103
-
-
Friedman, D.1
-
40
-
-
0003076045
-
Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring
-
Posner, op. cit., n. 32.
-
D. Wittman Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring 1977) 6 J. of Legal Studies 193 211.
-
(1977)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.6
, pp. 193-211
-
-
Wittman, D.1
-
41
-
-
84867666491
-
Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non-monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent
-
Polinsky and Shavell, op. cit., n. 48. For an application in environmental law, see
-
S. Shavell Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non-monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent 1985) 85 Columbia Law Rev. 1232 62.
-
(1985)
Columbia Law Rev.
, vol.85
, pp. 1232-62
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
42
-
-
49349094620
-
Imposing Criminal Liability on Government Officials under Environmental Law: A Legal and Economic Analysis
-
and. Easterbrook, op. cit., n. 55; Chu, op. cit., n. 55; Miceli, op. cit., n. 55. On the costs of punishing the innocent, see, also
-
M. Faure, I. Koopmans, and J. Oudijk Imposing Criminal Liability on Government Officials under Environmental Law: A Legal and Economic Analysis 1996) 18 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law J. 529 69.
-
(1996)
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law J.
, vol.18
, pp. 529-69
-
-
Faure, M.1
Koopmans, I.2
Oudijk, J.3
-
43
-
-
0002269896
-
Optimal Prosecution of Defendants whose Guilt is Uncertain
-
This argument explaining administrative penal law has been advanced by A. Ogus and C. Abott, 'Pollution and Penalties' in An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy: Issues in Institutional Design, ed. T. Swanson (2002) 493-518. See
-
T. Miceli Optimal Prosecution of Defendants whose Guilt is Uncertain 1990) 6 J. of Law, Economics and Organization 189 201.
-
(1990)
J. of Law, Economics and Organization
, vol.6
, pp. 189-201
-
-
Miceli, T.1
-
44
-
-
38349145576
-
Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties
-
and., for discussion. For a more historical perspective, see Lindgren, op. cit., n. 47, pp. 29-57. See
-
N. Garoupa and F. Gomez Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties 2004) 6 American Law and Economics Rev. 410 33
-
(2004)
American Law and Economics Rev.
, vol.6
, pp. 410-33
-
-
Garoupa, N.1
Gomez, F.2
-
45
-
-
0005123557
-
A Model of Optimal Incapacitation
-
Rasmusen develops the idea of using stigma as a deterrent, although Funk presents important objections to it. See
-
S. Shavell A Model of Optimal Incapacitation 1987) 77 Am. Economic Rev. 107 10.
-
(1987)
Am. Economic Rev.
, vol.77
, pp. 107-10
-
-
Shavell, S.1
-
46
-
-
0030529279
-
Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality
-
and
-
E. Rasmusen Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality 1996) 39 J. of Law and Economics 519 44
-
(1996)
J. of Law and Economics
, vol.39
, pp. 519-44
-
-
Rasmusen, E.1
-
47
-
-
3042692834
-
On the Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent
-
See, also
-
P. Funk On the Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent 2004) 48 European Economic Rev. 715 25.
-
(2004)
European Economic Rev.
, vol.48
, pp. 715-25
-
-
Funk, P.1
-
48
-
-
36749096289
-
The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization
-
and. ;
-
A. Klement and A. Harel The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization 2007) 36 J. of Legal Studies 355 78
-
(2007)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.36
, pp. 355-78
-
-
Klement, A.1
Harel, A.2
-
49
-
-
49349098835
-
Keeping Stigma out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs
-
and. See Note on
-
R. Galbiati and N. Garoupa Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs 2007) 15 Supreme Court Economic Rev. 273 83.
-
(2007)
Supreme Court Economic Rev.
, vol.15
, pp. 273-83
-
-
Galbiati, R.1
Garoupa, N.2
-
50
-
-
0037715197
-
Shame, Stigma and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law
-
'. See discussion by
-
' Shame, Stigma and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law 2003) 116 Harvard Law Rev. 2186 207.
-
(2003)
Harvard Law Rev.
, vol.116
, pp. 2186-207
-
-
-
51
-
-
84928843595
-
A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement
-
and. We acknowledge that it is a matter of debate if the administrative procedure is less accurate, but it is certainly less rule-governed.
-
P. Fenn and C. Veljanovski A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement 1988) 98 Economic J. 1055 77.
-
(1988)
Economic J.
, vol.98
, pp. 1055-77
-
-
Fenn, P.1
Veljanovski, C.2
-
52
-
-
33745735998
-
Incomplete Law - A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation
-
K. Pistor and C. Xu Incomplete Law - A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation 2003) 35 J. of International Law and Politics 931 1013.
-
(2003)
J. of International Law and Politics
, vol.35
, pp. 931-1013
-
-
Pistor, K.1
Xu, C.2
-
53
-
-
84882046105
-
The Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case
-
; D.D. Friedman, 'Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century' (1995) University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 2;
-
D. D. Friedman The Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case 1979) 8 J. of Legal Studies 399 415
-
(1979)
J. of Legal Studies
, vol.8
, pp. 399-415
-
-
Friedman, D.D.1
-
54
-
-
0346117337
-
The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law
-
See < >. Treasury of the Commonwealth of Australia, 'Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law' (2007) 10. F.H Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1996) 316.
-
F. Parisi The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law 2001) 3 Am. Law and Economics Rev. 50 81.
-
(2001)
Am. Law and Economics Rev.
, vol.3
, pp. 50-81
-
-
Parisi, F.1
-
55
-
-
0242637059
-
Criminalization of Fatal Medical Mistakes
-
See, also
-
J. Holbrook Criminalization of Fatal Medical Mistakes 2003) 327 Brit. Medical J. 1118 19.
-
(2003)
Brit. Medical J.
, vol.327
, pp. 1118-19
-
-
Holbrook, J.1
-
56
-
-
33746902316
-
Prosecuting "gross" Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion, and the Crown Prosecution Service
-
S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Environmental Law (2005, 6th edn.). See
-
O. Quick Prosecuting "Gross" Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion, and the Crown Prosecution Service 2006) 33 J. of Law and Society 421 50.
-
(2006)
J. of Law and Society
, vol.33
, pp. 421-50
-
-
Quick, O.1
-
57
-
-
0036035530
-
Sanctions for Pollution: Do we have the Right Regime?
-
and. ; they also argue that the United Kingdom should make more use of administrative law in sanctioning violations of environmental laws in Ogus and Abott, op. cit., n. 67. For example, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. For hate crimes, see the debate in
-
A. Ogus and C. Abott Sanctions for Pollution: Do we have the Right Regime? 2002) 14 J. of Environmental Law 283 300
-
(2002)
J. of Environmental Law
, vol.14
, pp. 283-300
-
-
Ogus, A.1
Abott, C.2
-
58
-
-
17444366259
-
Penalty Enhancements for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis
-
and., and D. Dharmapala, N. Garoupa, and R. McAdams, 'The Just World Bias and Hate Crime Statutes', mimeograph (2007).
-
D. Dharmapala and N. Garoupa Penalty Enhancements for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis 2004) 6 Am. Law and Economics Rev. 185 207
-
(2004)
Am. Law and Economics Rev.
, vol.6
, pp. 185-207
-
-
Dharmapala, D.1
Garoupa, N.2
|