A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 204-218

  D'Antoni, Massimo ^a   Galbiati, Roberto ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INSUBRIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Nonmonetary sanctions; Optimal deterrence

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548028943     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.008     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Barigozzi F., and Villeneuve B. The signaling effect of tax policy. Journal of Public Economic Theory 8 (2006) 611-630
2. Bebchuk L.A., and Kaplow L. Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. Journal of Legal Studies 21 (1992) 365-370
3. Becker G.S. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968) 169-217
4. Ben-Shahar O. Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing the crime. International Review of Law and Economics 17 (1997) 409-421
5. Dittmann I. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment if governments don't maximize welfare. Journal of Public Economic Theory 8 (2006) 677-695
6. Friedman D. Why not hang them all: the virtues of inefficient punishment. Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999) s259-s269
7. Garoupa N. The theory of optimal law enforcement. Journal of Economic Surveys 11 (1997) 267-295
8. Garoupa N. Optimal law enforcement with dissemination of information. European Journal of Law and Economics 7 (1999) 183-196
9. Garoupa N., and Klerman D. Optimal law enforcement with a rentseeking government. American Law and Economics Review 4 (2002) 116-140
10. Jorgensen F., and Wentel-Larsen T. Car drivers' willingness to pay for not loosing their driving license. Transportation 29 (2002) 271-286
11. Kaplow L., and Shavell S. Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle. Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001) 281-286
12. Polinsky A.M., and Shavell S. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment. Journal of Public Economics 24 (1984) 89-99
13. Polinsky A.M., and Shavell S. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2000) 45-76
14. Polinsky A.M., and Shavell S. The fairness of sanctions: Some implications for optimal enforcement policy. American Law and Economics Review 2 (2000) 223-237
15. Shavell S. A model of optimal incapacitation. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 77 (1987) 107-110
16. Wickelgren A.L. Justifying imprisonment: on the optimality of excessively costly punishment. American Law and Economics Review 5 (2003) 377-411