The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 457-486

  Haruvy, Ernan ^a   Roth, Alvin E ^b   Ünver, M Utku ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiments; Genetic algorithm; Learning; Matching; Professional labor markets; Unraveling

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144458564     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2005.02.002     Document Type: Article

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