An independent central bank faced with elected governments

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 907-922

  Demertzis, Maria ^a   Hallett, Andrew Hughes ^b,c   Viegi, Nicola ^d  

^a Research Department   (Netherlands)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU NATAL   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Accountability; Central bank independence; Fiscal policy; Political uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 4844223345     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.12.004     Document Type: Article

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