Central Bank independence: Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise

Journal of Macroeconomics

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 661-677

  Demertzis, Maria ^a  

^a Sanquin Blood Supply   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Central Bank independence; Output stability; Political uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 4844224615     PISSN: 01640704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2003.06.002     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. A. Alesina L. Summers Central Bank independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25 2 1993 151-161
4. M. Crosby Central Bank independence and output variability Economics Letters 60 1998 67-75
5. M. Demertzis A. Hughes Hallett N. Viegi An independent Central Bank faced with elected governments The European Journal of Political Economy 20 4 2004 907-922
6. Melitz J. 1997. Some Cross-Country Evidence about Debt, Deficits and the behaviour of Monetary and Fiscal Authorities, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper, London, No. 1653
7. K. Rogoff The optimal degree of commitment to a monetary target Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 4 1985 1169-1190
8. Viegi N. 1998. A note on central bank independence, political uncertainty and the correct assignment of instruments to targets, ICMM Discussion Paper Series, No. 51, November, University of Strathclyde