Copeland method II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 148-172

  Merlin, Vincent R ^a   Saari, Donald G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030640012     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2205     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. 1. J. J. Bartholdi III and J. A. Olin, Single transferable vote resists strategic voting, Social Choice Welfare 8 (1991), 341-354.
2. 2. J. J. Bartholdi III, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick, How hard is it to control an election?, Math. Comput. Modeling 16 (1992), 27-40.
3. 3. Marquis de Condorcet, "Essai sur l'application à la possibilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité de voix," Paris, 1785.
4. 4. A. H. Copeland, A "reasonable" social welfare function, Seminar on Applications of Mathematics to Social Sciences, University of Michigan, 1951.
5. 5. P. J. Fishburn and S. J. Brams, Paradoxes of preferential voting, Math. Magazine 56 (1983), 207-214.
6. 6. P. C. Fishburn and S. J. Brams, Manipulation of voting by sincere truncation of preferences, Public Choice 44 (1984), 397-410.
7. 7. P. C. Fishburn and W. V. Gehrlein, Paradox of voting: Effects of individual indifference and intransitivity, J. Public Econ. 14 (1980), 83-94.
8. 8. A. F. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes; a general result, Econometrica 41 (1973), 587-601.
9. 9. E. Maskin, Monotonicity and strategyproofness, 1977.
10. 10. H. Moulin, Condorcet's principle implies the no-show paradox, J. Econ. Theory 45 (1988), 53-64.
11. 11. E. Muller and M. Satterthwaite, Equivalence of strong positive association and strategyproofness, J. Econ. Theory (1977), 412-418.
12. 12. H. Nurmi, "Comparing Voting Systems," Reidel, Dordrecht, 1989.
13. 13. D. G. Saari, "Geometry of Voting," Springer-Verlag, New York, 1994.
14. 14. D. G. Saari, A dictionary for voting paradoxes, J. Econ. Theory 48 (1988), 443-475.
15. 15. D. G. Saari, Consistency of decision processes, Ann. Operations Res. 23 (1991), 103-137.
16. 16. D. G. Saari, A chaotic exploration of aggregation paradoxes, SIAM Rev. 37 (1995), 37-52.
17. 17. D. G. Saari, "Basic Geometry of Voting," Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York, 1995.
18. 18. D. G. Saari and V. Merlin, The Copeland method I; Relationships and the dictionary, Econ. Theory (1996).
19. 19. J. H. Smith, Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate, Econometrica 41 (973), 1027-1041.
20. 20. M. A. Satterthwaite, Strategyproofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondences for voting procedures and social welfare functions, J. Econ. Theory (1975), 187-217.
21. 21. H. P. Young, Social choice scoring functions, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 28 (1975), 824-838.