Salience reasoning

Topoi

Volumn 27, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 41-55

  Postema, Gerald J ^a  

^a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

Author keywords

Analogy; Convention; Correlated equilibrium; Lewis; Norm; Practical reasoning; Salience; Schelling; Social cooperation; Team reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 47949125426     PISSN: 01677411     EISSN: 15728749     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9031-6     Document Type: Article

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