Political cycles: Issue ownership and the opposition advantage

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 685-716

  Soubeyran, Raphaël ^a   Gautier, Pascal ^b  

^a UMR MOISA   (France)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47249156771     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00382.x     Document Type: Article

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