Democratic public good provision

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 133, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 127-151

  Hassler, John ^a,b   Storesletten, Kjetil ^b,c   Zilibotti, Fabrizio ^a,b  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Markov equilibrium; Multiple equilibria; Political economy; Public good; Ramsey taxation; Redistribution; Repeated voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847046472     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.013     Document Type: Article

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