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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 134, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 287-316

Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships

(3) Cripps, Martin W a Mailath, George J b Samuelson, Larry c

a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS (United States)

b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (United States)

c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Imperfect monitoring; Private beliefs; Repeated games; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247171670 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: 10957235 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (18)

References (13)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.