Environmental conflicts and the SLAPP

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 253-273

  Hurley, Terrance M ^a   Shogren, Jason F ^b  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION;

USA;

EID: 0031193965     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1997.0996     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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