Violator avoidance activities and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 239-256

  Innes, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035632623     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/17.1.239     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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