Costly expertise

American Economic Review

Volumn 98, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 187-193

  Gerardi, Dino ^a   Yariv, Leeat ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44949228311     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.2.187     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

1. Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem." American Political Science Review, 90(1): 34-45.
2. Cai, Hongbin. 2003. "Optimal Committee Design with Heterogeneous Preferences." Unpublished.
3. Calvert, Randall L. 1985. "The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice," Journal of Politics, 47(2): 530-55.
4. Che, Yeon-Koo, and Navin Kartik. 2007. "Opinions as Incentives." Unpublished.
5. Dur, Robert, and Otto H. Swank. 2005. "Producing and Manipulating Information." Economic Journal, 115(500): 185-99.
6. Feddersen, Timothy J., and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review, 92(1): 23-35.
7. Gerardi, Dino, and Leeat Yariv. 2008. "Information Acquisition in Committees." Games and Economic Behavior, 62: 436-59.
8. Gerardi, Dino, and Leeat Yariv. 2007a. "Deliberative Voting." Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1): 317-38.
9. Gerardi, Dino., and Leeat Yariv. 2007b. "Costly Expertise,"http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~lyariv/Papers/CostlyExpertise.pdf.
10. Gershkov, Alex, and Balázs Szentes. Forthcoming. "Optimal Voting Scheme with Costly Information Acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory.
11. Li, Hao. 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism." Journal of Political Economy, 109(3): 617-36.
12. Persico, Nicola. 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information." Review of Economic Studies, 71(1): 165-91.
13. Smorodinsky, Rann, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 2006. "Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations - The Anonymous Case." Games and Economic Behavior, 55(2): 385-406.