Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 515-528

  Bhaskar, V ^a   Mailath, George J ^b   Morris, Stephen ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief free equilibria; Purification; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649138878     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.10.004     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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