A game-theoretic analysis of strictly competitive multiagent scenarios

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1199-1206

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Fischer, Felix ^a   Harrenstein, Paul ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPARATIVE STUDIES; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA; ECONOMIC SITUATION; EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PARTICULAR SOLUTION; SOLUTION CONCEPTS; UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS;

DECISION THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 44449094877     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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