Strategic defense and attack for reliability systems

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

Volumn 93, Issue 11, 2008, Pages 1740-1750

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Contest success function; Game theory; Malicious acts; Reliability theory; Series parallel system

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER CRIME; FAILURE ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; INVESTMENTS; PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEMS;

CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION; MALICIOUS ACTS; SERIES-PARALLEL SYSTEM;

RELIABILITY THEORY;

EID: 44349153674     PISSN: 09518320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2007.11.002     Document Type: Article

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