Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management. A multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty

Automatica

Volumn 44, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1488-1503

  Carraro, Carlo ^a,b,c   Sgobbi, Alessandra ^b,c  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI   (Italy)

^c CENTRO EURO MEDITERRANEO SUI CAMBIAMENTI CLIMATICI   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Non cooperative game theory; Simulation models; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD; NATURAL RESOURCES; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

BARGAINING; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; SIMULATION MODELS;

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 44349115499     PISSN: 00051098     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2007.12.021     Document Type: Article

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