Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 347-368

  Gneezy, Uri ^a,b   Haruvy, Ernan ^c   Roth, Alvin E ^d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^d HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242403085     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00151-9     Document Type: Article

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