Negotiating on water: Insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

Environment and Development Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 329-349

  Carraro, Carlo ^a,c   Marchiori, Carmen ^b   Sgobbi, Alessandra ^a  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947424684     PISSN: 1355770X     EISSN: 14697998     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X06003536     Document Type: Review

References (64)

1. Adams, G., G. Rausser, and L. Simon (1996), 'Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California Water Policy', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 30: 97-111.
2. Alesina, A., I. Angeloni, and F. Etro (2001), 'The political economy of unions', NBER Working Paper December 2001.
3. Ambec, S. and Y. Sprumont (2000), 'Sharing a river', GREEN 00(06).
4. Barrett, S. (1997), 'Heterogeneous international agreements', in C. Carraro (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 9-25.
5. Bennet, L.L., S.E. Ragland, and P. Yolles (1998), 'Facilitating international agreements through an interconnected game approach: The case of river basin', in R. Just and S. Netanyahu (eds), Conflict and Cooperation in Transboundary Water Resources, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishing, pp. 61-85.
6. Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky (1986), 'The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling', The Rand Journal of Economics 17:176-188.
7. Breslin, J.W., E. Siskind, and L.F. Susskin (eds) (1990), Nine Case Studies in International Environmental Negotiation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
8. Breslin, J.W., E.J. Dolin, and L.F. Susskind (eds) (1992), International Environmental Treaty Making, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
9. Carraro, C., C. Marchiori, and A. Sgobbi (2005a), 'Applications of negotiation theory to water issues', FEEM Working Paper 65.05 and World Bank Working Paper 3641.
10. Carraro, C., C. Marchiori, and A. Sgobbi (2005b), 'Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness', FEEM Working Paper 66.05 and World Bank Working Paper 3642.
11. Carraro, C. and D. Siniscalco (1997), 'R&D cooperation and the stability of international environmental agreements', in C. Carraro (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 71-95.
12. Cesar, H. and A. De Zeeuw (1996), 'Issue linkage in global environmental problems', in A. Xepapadeas (ed.), Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 153-173.
13. Conca, K. and G.D. Dabelko (2002), Environmental Peacemaking, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
14. Crow, B. and N. Singh (2000), 'Impediments and innovations in international rivers: The waters of South Asia', World Development 28: 1907-1925.
15. Diehl, P.F. and N.P. Gleditsch (2001), Environmental Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
16. Dinar, A. and S. Alemu (2000), 'The process of negotiation over international water disputes: The case of the Nile Basin', International Negotiations 5: 331-356.
17. Dinar, A. and A. Wolf (1994a), 'International markets for water and potential for regional cooperation: Economic and political perspectives in the western Middle East', Economics Development and Cultural Change 43: 43-66.
18. Dinar, A. and A. Wolf (1994b), 'Middle East hydro-politics and equity measures for water-sharing agreements', Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 19: 69-93.
19. Dixon, L.S. (1999), 'Common property aspects of ground-water use and drainage generation', in A. Dinar and D. Zilberman (eds), The Economics and Management of Water and Drainage in Agriculture, Boston/Dordrecht/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishing, pp. 677-697.
20. Folmer, H., P. van Mouche, and S. Ragland (1993), 'Interconnected games and international environmental problems', Environmental Resource Economics 3: 313-335.
21. Gardner-Outlow, T. and R. Engelman (1997), Sustaining Water, Easing Scarcity: A Second Update, Washington, DC: Population Action International.
22. Gisser, M. and D.A. Sanchez (1980), 'Competition vs. optimal control in groundwater pumping', Water Resources Research 16: 638-642.
23. Haddadin, M.J. (2002), 'Water in the Middle East peace process', The Geographical Journal 168: 324-340.
24. Hanley, N. and H. Folmer (1998), Game Theory and the Environment, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
25. Just, R.E. and S. Netanyahu (2000), 'The importance of structure in linking games', Agricultural Economics 24: 87-100.
26. Katsoulacos, Y. (1997), 'R&D spillovers, R&D cooperation, innovation and international environmental agreements', in C. Carraro (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 97-109.
27. Kilgour, M.D. and A. Dinar (1995), 'Are stable agreements for sharing international river now possible?', Policy Research Working Paper 1474, The World Bank.
28. Kilgour, M.D. and A. Dinar (2001), 'Flexible water sharing within an international river basin', Environmental and Resource Economics 18: 43-60.
29. Kilot, N. (1994), Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, London: Routledge.
30. Koundouri, P. (2004), 'Potential for groundwater management: Gisser-Sanchez effect reconsidered', Water Resources Research 40.
31. Krawczyk, J.B. and M. Tidball (2003), 'A model of intertemporal competition for water levels', Conference on Computation in Economics and Finance.
32. Lonergan, S.C. (2001), 'Water and conflict: Rhetoric and reality', in P.F. Diehl and N.P. Gleditsch (eds), Environmental Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 109-124.
33. MEA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment) (2005), 'Living beyond our means: natural assets and human well-being', Statement from the Board, MEA.
34. Missfeldt, F. (1999), 'Game-theoretic modelling of transboundary pollution', Journal of Economic Surveys 13: 287-321.
35. Muthoo, A. (1999), Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. NEPAD (2003), 'Action Plan of the Environment Initiative of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)', United Nations Environment Programme.
37. Provencher, B. and O. Burt (1993), 'The externalities associated with the common property exploitation of groundwater', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 139-158.
38. Provencher, B. and O. Burt (1994), 'A private property rights regime for the commons: The case for groundwater', Land Economics 69: 325-340.
39. Putnam, R.D. (1988), 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games', International Organizations 42: 427-460.
40. Rausser, G. (2000), 'Collective choice in water resource systems', in A. Dinar (ed.), The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 49-78.
41. Rausser, G. and L. Simon (1992), 'A non-cooperative model of collective decision making: A multilateral bargaining approach', Working Paper 618, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley
42. Richards, A. and N. Singh (1996), 'Two level negotiations in bargaining over water', Department of Economics working paper, University of California, Santa Cruz.
43. Roseta-Palma, C. (2002), 'Groundwater management and endogenous water quality', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44: 44-93.
44. Roseta-Palma, C. and A. Xepapadeas (2004), 'Robust control in water managemenR: Special issue: risk and uncertainty in environment and resource economics', International Conference, Wageningen, The Netherlands', Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 29: 21-34.
45. Rubinstein, A. (1982), 'Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model', Econometrica 50: 97-110.
46. Šauer, P., A. Dvorak, A. Lisa, and P. Fiala (2003), 'A procedure for negotiating pollution reduction under information asymmetry: Surface water quality case', Environmental and Resource Economics 24: 103-119.
47. Sebenius, J.K. (1983), 'Negotiation arithmetic: Adding and subtracting issues and parties', International Organisation 37: 281-316.
48. Shmueli, D.F. (1999), 'Approaches to water dispute resolution: applications to the Arab-Israeli negotiations', International Relation 4: 295-325.
49. Simon, L., R. Goodhue, G. Rausser, S. Thoyer, S. Morardet, and P. Rio (2003), 'Structure and power in multilateral negotiations: An application to French Water Policy', August 14.
50. Supalla, R.J. (2000), 'A game theoretic analysis of institutional arrangements for Platte river management', Water Resource Development 16: 253-264.
51. Supalla, R., B. Klaus, O. Yeboah, and R. Bruins (2002), 'A game theory approach to deciding who will supply instream flow water', Journal of the American Water Resources Association 38: 959-966.
52. Thoyer, S., S. Morardet, P. Rio, L. Simon, R. Goodhue, and G. Rausser (2001), 'A bargaining model to simulate negotiations between water users', Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 4.
53. Tollison, R.D. and T.D. Willett (1979), 'An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations', International Organisation 33: 425-449.
54. Tsebelis, G. (1990), Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
55. Tsur, Y. (1990), 'The stabilization role of groundwater when surface water supplies are uncertain: The implications for groundwater development', Water Resources Research 26: 811-818.
56. Tsur, Y. and T. Graham-Tomasi (1991), 'The buffer value of groundwater with stochastic surface water supplies', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 21: 201-224.
57. Tsur, Y. and A. Zemel (1995), 'Uncertainty and irreversibility in groundwater resource management', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29: 149-161.
58. UN (1992), 'Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development', Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992.
59. UN (2000), United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2.
60. UNESCO (2003),'The UN World water development report: Water for people, water for life', UN World Water Assessment Programme.
61. UNEP (2003), Global Environment Outlook 2003.
62. Wolf, A.T., K. Stahl, and M.F. Macomber (2003), 'Conflict and cooperation within international river basins: The importance of institutional capacity', Water Resources Update 125.
63. Yoffe, S., G. Fiske, M. Giordano, K. Larson, K. Stahl, and A.T. Wolf (2004), 'Geography of international water conflict and cooperation: Data sets and applications', Water Resources Research 40.
64. Zeitouni, N. (2004), 'Optimal extraction from a renewable groundwater aquifer with stochastic recharge', Water Resources Research 40.