메뉴 건너뛰기
Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 89, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 234-246
A Note on the Optimal Structure of Production
Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

EID: 0347601942     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2569     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)
References (12)
  • 2
    • 84988084563 scopus 로고
    • Information, control, and organizational structure
    • Baron D. P., Besanko D. Information, control, and organizational structure. J. Econ. Manag. Strategy. 1:1993;237-275.
    • (1993) J. Econ. Manag. Strategy , vol.1 , pp. 237-275
    • Baron, D.P.1    Besanko, D.2
  • 3
    • 6444233545 scopus 로고
    • The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries
    • Dana J. D. Jr. The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries. J. Econ. Theory. 59:1993;288-310.
    • (1993) J. Econ. Theory , vol.59 , pp. 288-310
    • Dana J.D., Jr.1
  • 4
    • 0346670595 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Optimal Hierarchies in a Joint Production Framework
    • Universidad Carlos III
    • de Frutos M. A., da Rocha J. M. Optimal Hierarchies in a Joint Production Framework. working paper. 1999;Universidad Carlos III.
    • (1999) Working Paper
    • De Frutos, M.A.1    Da Rocha, J.M.2
  • 5
    • 0001479210 scopus 로고
    • Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments
    • Demski J. S., Sappington D. Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments. Econ. Lett. 13:1983;325-330.
    • (1983) Econ. Lett. , vol.13 , pp. 325-330
    • Demski, J.S.1    Sappington, D.2
  • 6
    • 45149087875 scopus 로고
    • Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
    • Demski J. S., Sappington D. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents. J. Econ. Theory. 33:1984;152-171.
    • (1984) J. Econ. Theory , vol.33 , pp. 152-171
    • Demski, J.S.1    Sappington, D.2
  • 7
    • 21844494271 scopus 로고
    • Regulating complementary products: A comparative institutional analysis
    • Gilbert R. J., Riordan M. Regulating complementary products: A comparative institutional analysis. RAND J. Econ. 26:1995;243-256.
    • (1995) RAND J. Econ. , vol.26 , pp. 243-256
    • Gilbert, R.J.1    Riordan, M.2
  • 8
    • 38248999816 scopus 로고
    • Collusion, incentives, and risk sharing
    • Itoh H. Collusion, incentives, and risk sharing. J. Econ. Theory. 60:1993;410-427.
    • (1993) J. Econ. Theory , vol.60 , pp. 410-427
    • Itoh, H.1
  • 9
    • 38249002975 scopus 로고
    • Moral hazard with several agents: The gains from cooperation
    • Macho-Stadler I., Pérez-Castrillo D. Moral hazard with several agents: The gains from cooperation. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 11:1990;73-100.
    • (1990) Int. J. Ind. Organ. , vol.11 , pp. 73-100
    • Macho-Stadler, I.1    Pérez-Castrillo, D.2
  • 10
  • 11
    • 0000237316 scopus 로고
    • Information, incentives, and organizational mode
    • Riordan M., Sappington D. Information, incentives, and organizational mode. Quart. J. Econ. 1987;243-263.
    • (1987) Quart. J. Econ. , pp. 243-263
    • Riordan, M.1    Sappington, D.2
  • 12
    • 0001297642 scopus 로고
    • Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations
    • Tirole J. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. J. Law Econ. Organ. 2:1986;181-214.
    • (1986) J. Law Econ. Organ. , vol.2 , pp. 181-214
    • Tirole, J.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.