Poverty and the moral significance of contribution

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 299-315

  Øverland, Gerhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949109975     PISSN: 17404681     EISSN: 17455243     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1740468105059325     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. For two recent evaluations of the claim that affluent people in the West contribute global poverty see: Bashshar Haydar, 'Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility', Metaphilosophy 36 (2005), pp. 240-52 (243)
2. and Mathias Risse, 'Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?', Ethics & International Affairs 19 (2005), pp. 9-18
3. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2002), p. 25
4. Christian Barry used the term 'contribution principle' in a talk held at the Global Justice conference in Oslo 2003. In a recent article, Barry has given the following formulation of his contribution principle: 'agents are responsible for addressing acute deprivations when they have contributed, or are contributing, to bringing them about' (Christian Barry, 'Applying the Contribution Principle', Metaphilosophy 36 [2005], pp. 210-27 [211]). I do not see why a principle of contribution should include a particular concern for the acutely deprived. What is essential according to the idea of contribution is that we do not contribute to harm, not that we do not contribute to acute deprivation. In case we should show particular concern for the acutely deprived that would have to be on other grounds. Anyway, my concern here is exactly to question the idea that contributors have a particular concern for, in the sense of duty to assist, their acutely deprived victims
5. There is, of course, a question concerning the level of evidence that should be required in order to establish that we do so. For an interesting discussion of contribution under uncertainty, see Barry, 'Applying the Contribution Principle', pp. 210-27
6. This is in accordance with Haydar: 'I take the claim that an agent is responsible for some harm to mean that the agent has special obligation to alleviate that situation or prevent it from taking place' (Haydar, 'Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility', p. 240)
7. According to Peter Singer, a plausible principle states that if we can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it (Peter Singer, Practical Ethics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], p. 230). A less demanding reinterpretation of the principle of assistance states that if we can prevent something bad from happening at low cost to ourselves, we ought to do it
8. In this sense I agree with Pogge when he maintains that if having attacked a particular person, 'the attacker has more reason to ensure that his victim's injuries are treated than a bystander' (Thomas Pogge, 'Real World Justice', The Journal of Ethics 9 [2005], pp. 29-53 [34])
9. Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 7
10. For a full discussion see Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, pp. 74-101
11. For a critical assessment see Richard J. Arneson, 'Moral Limits on the Demands of Beneficence', in Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 33-58 (35-39)
12. A similar point is made by Arneson who maintains that: 'The mere fact of noncompliance by some does not automatically set an upper limit on the amount of sacrifice it is reasonable to demand of others who can provide cost-effective aid' (Arneson, 'Moral Limits on the Demands of Beneficence', p. 37)
13. This is, as I understand it, part of what David Miller takes to be the problem of remedial responsibility. See his 'Distributing Responsibility', Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2001), pp. 453-71
14. Thomas Pogge, '"Assisting" the Global Poor', in Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 260-88 (278)
15. To the extent that the driver is innocent, it is a question of using defensive force against innocent aggressors/threats. On the permissibility of use of such force see my 'Self-defence among Innocent People', Journal of Moral Philosophy 2.2 (2005), pp. 127-46
16. Pogge, 'Real World Justice', p. 34
17. See Frances M. Kamm, 'The New Problem of Distance in Morality', in Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 59-74 (65)
18. We might, for example, imagine someone having a duty to meet a particular person for lunch because she promised to do so. On her way, she sees someone dying of kidney failure. She is willing to give him her kidney. According to Kamm, it is wrong in this case to say that the supererogatory aiding may not take precedence over the duty. See Frances M. Kamm, 'Rescue and Harm: Discussion of Peter Unger's Living High and Letting Die', Legal Theory 5 (1999), pp. 1-44 (21)