Moral limits on the demands of beneficence?

The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 33-58

  Arneson, Richard J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 84924662113     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511817663.004     Document Type: Chapter

References (21)

1. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (Spring, 1972), 229-43.
2. Frances M. Kamm, “Famine Ethics: The Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer’s Ethical Theory,” in Dale Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 162-208.
3. Michael Slote, “The Justice of Caring,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 15: 1 (Winter, 1998), 171-95.
4. Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
5. Liam Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22:4 (Fall, 1993), 267-92.
6. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7. Tim Mulgan, “Two Conceptions of Benevolence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26:1 (Winter, 1997), 62-79.
8. Liam B. Murphy, “A Relatively Plausible Principle of Beneficence: Reply to Mulgan,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26:1 (Winter, 1997), 80-6.
9. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal theory, pp. 127-33.
10. Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
11. Jean Hampton, “Selflessness and the Loss of Self,” Social Philosophy and Policy (December, 1993), 135-65.
12. C. D. Broad, “Self and Others,” in Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. D. Cheney (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971).
13. Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, in The Oxford Illustrated Dickens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 358.
14. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, revised edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. viii.
15. Scheffler, Rejection, p. 20.
16. Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation, ” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13: 3 (Summer, 1984), 239-54.
17. Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation”.
18. Frances Kamm, “Supererogation and Obligation, ” Journal of Philosophy, 82: (1985), pp. 118-38.
19. Scheffler replies in “Prerogatives without Restrictions, ” reprinted in the revised edition of The Rejection of Consequentialism, pp. 167-92.
20. R. M. Hare in Moral Thinking: Its Method, Levels, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
21. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1979), chap. 5, p. 47.