On cheating, doping and whistleblowing

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 415-436

  Berentsen, Aleksander ^a   Bruegger, Esther ^b   Loertscher, Simon ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^b NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

C72; D82; Inspection games; K21; K42; Leniency; Signalling; Whistleblowing

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949092133     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.12.002     Document Type: Article

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