Leniency programs and cartel prosecution

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 347-379

  Motta, Massimo ^a   Polo, Michele ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASSARI   (Italy)

Author keywords

Amnesty; Antitrust; Collusion; Optimal law enforcement; Self reporting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867985181     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00057-7     Document Type: Article

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