Blowing the whistle

Economic Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 143-166

  Apesteguia, Jose ^a   Dufwenberg, Martin ^b   Selten, Reinhard ^c  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Amnesty; Anti trust; Bertrand model; Blow the whistle; Cartels; Experiment communication; Immunity; Leniency; Price competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846467816     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8     Document Type: Article

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