Leniency policies and illegal transactions

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 6-7, 2006, Pages 1281-1297

  Buccirossi, Paolo ^a   Spagnolo, Giancarlo ^b,c,d  

^a LEAR Laboratorio di Economia   (Italy)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^c Consip Research Unit ^*  (Italy)

^d CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Amnesty; Collusion; Corruption; Financial fraud; Governance; Hold up; Hostages; Illegal trade; Immunity; Law enforcement; Leniency; Organized crime; Self reporting; Whistleblowers

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646472593     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.008     Document Type: Article

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