Legal remedies for breach of the regulatory "contract"

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 107-132

  Lyon, Thomas P ^a   Huang, Haizhou ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036398016     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020519010628     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, and P. Rey. 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information." Econometrica 62: 257-282.
2. Ayres, I., and R. Gertner. 1992. "Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules." Yale Law Journal 101: 729-773.
3. Besanko, D., and D. F. Spulber. 1992. "Sequential-Equilibrium Investment by Regulated Firms." RAND Journal of Economics 23: 153-170.
4. Brennan, T., and J. Boyd. 1997. "Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts." Journal of Regulatory Economics 11: 41-54.
5. Che, Y.-K., and T.-Y. Chung. 1999. "Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments." RAND Journal of Economics 30: 84-105.
6. Che, Y.-K., and D. B. Hausch. 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting." American Economic Review 89: 125-147.
7. Crocker, K. J., and S. E. Masten. 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation." Journal of Regulatory Economics 9: 5-39.
8. Edlin, A. S., and S. Reichelstein. 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment." American Economic Review 18: 478-501.
9. Froeb, L., and B. S. Kobayashi. 1996. "Naive, Biased Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively-Produced Evidence?" Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12: 257-276.
10. Goldberg, V. 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts." Bell Journal of Economics 7: 426-452.
11. Gong, J., and R. P. McAfee. 2000. "Pretrial Negotiation, Litigation and Procedural Rules." Economic Inquiry 38: 218-238.
12. Hadfield, G. 1999. "Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government." Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 8: 467-537.
13. Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation." Econometrica 56: 755-786.
14. Hart, O. D., and J. D. Moore. 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts." Review of Economic Studies 66: 115-138.
15. Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole. 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
16. Levy, B., and P. T. Spiller (Eds.) 1996. Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17. Lyon, T. P., and S. C. Hackett. 1993. "Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-term Contracting in Natural Gas." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 9: 380-398.
18. Lyon, T. P., and J. W. Mayo. 1999. "Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry." mimeo, Indiana University.
19. Michaels, R. J. 1996. "Stranded Costs, Stranded Intellectuals. " Regulation 1: 47-51.
20. Noldeke, G., and K. M. Schmidt. 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Holdup Problem." RAND Journal of Economics 26: 163-179.
21. Rose-Ackerman, S., and J. Rossi. 2000. "Disentangling Deregulatory Takings." Virginia Law Review 86: 1435-1495.
22. Schwartz, A., and J. Watson. 2000. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting." mimeo, University of California at San Diego.
23. Schweitzer, U. 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information." Review of Economic Studies 68: 163-178.
24. Segal, I. 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts." Review of Economic Studies 66: 57-82.
25. Sidak, J. G., and D. F. Spulber. 1997. Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
26. Troesken, W. 1996. Why Regulate Utilities? The New Institutional Economics and the Chicago Gas Industry, 1849-1924. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
27. Williamson, O. E. 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies in General and with respect to CATV." Bell Journal of Economics 7: 73-104.
28. Zimmerman, M. B. 1988. "Regulatory Treatment of Abandoned Property: Incentive Effects and Policy Issues." Journal of Law and Economics 31: 127-144.