Strong reciprocity and the emergence of large-scale societies

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 192-210

  Dubreuîl, Benot ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Cultural evolution; Political evolution; Strong reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 43349086616     PISSN: 00483931     EISSN: 15527441     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0048393108315509     Document Type: Article

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