Multiple directorships and corporate diversification

Journal of Empirical Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 418-435

  Jiraporn, Pornsit ^a   Kim, Young Sang ^b   Davidson III, Wallace N ^c  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Board appointments; Diversification; Multiple directorships

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649102037     PISSN: 09275398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2007.07.002     Document Type: Article

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