Taxation and presidential approval: Separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?

Public Choice

Volumn 135, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 301-317

  Geys, Benny ^a   Vermeir, Jan ^b  

^a WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

^b VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Popularity function; Presidential approval ratings; Tax policy; Tax structure turbulence

Indexed keywords

EID: 42449090336     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9264-8     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Ashworth, J., & Heyndels, B. (2000). Politicians' opinions on tax reform. Public Choice, 103, 117-138.
2. Ashworth, J., & Heyndels, B. (2002). Tax structure turbulence in OECD countries. Public Choice, 111, 347-376.
3. Ashworth, J., Geys, B., & Heyndels, B. (2006). Determinants of tax innovation: the case of environmental taxes in Flemish municipalities. European Journal of Political Economy, 22(1), 223-247.
4. Barro, R. J. (1989). The Ricardian approach to budget deficits. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(2), 37-54.
5. Belke, A., & Goecke, M. (1999). A simple model of hysteresis in employment under exchange rate uncertainty. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 46, 260-286.
6. Berry, F. S., & Berry, W. D. (1992). Tax innovation in the States: capitalizing on political opportunity. American Journal of Political Science, 36(3), 715-742.
7. Berry, F. S., & Berry, W. D. (1994). The politics of tax increases in the States. American Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 855-859.
8. Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995). Incumbent behavior: vote-seeking, tax-setting and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85, 25-45.
9. Bloom, H. S., & Price, H. D. (1975). Voter response to short-run economic conditions: the asymmetric effect of prosperity and recession. American Political Science Review, 69(4), 1240-1254.
10. Case, A. (1994). Taxes and the electoral cycle: How sensitive are governors to coming elections? Business Review, March/April, 17-26.
11. Cusack, T. R. (1999). The shaping of popular satisfaction with government and regime performance in Germany. British Journal of Political Science, 29, 641-672.
12. Cuzán, A. G., & Bundrick, C. M. (1999). Fiscal policy as a forecasting factor in presidential elections. American Politics Quarterly, 27(3), 338-353.
13. Dagenais, M. G., & Dagenais, D. L. (1997). Higher moment estimators for linear regression modes with errors in variables. Journal of Econometrics, 76, 193-221.
14. Dixit, A. (1989). Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 620-638.
15. Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
16. Eismeier, T. J. (1979). Budgets and ballots: the political consequences of fiscal choice. In D. Rae & T. Eismeier (Eds.), Public policy and public choice (pp. 121-149). (Beverly Hills: Sage).
17. Enders, W. (2004). Applied econometric time series. (2nd edn.). Hoboken: Wiley.
18. Fuller, W. A. (1976). Introduction to statistical time-series. New York: Wiley.
19. Gaines, B. J. (2002). Where's the rally? Approval and trust of the president, cabinet, congress, and government since September 11. PS: Political Science and Politics, 35(3), 531-536.
20. Geys, B., & Vermeir, J. (2007). The political cost of taxation: new evidence from German popularity ratings. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, München.
21. Gibson, J. G. (1994). Voter reaction to tax change: the case of the poll tax. Applied Economics, 26, 877-884.
22. Gronke, P., & Newman, B. (2003). FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: a field essay on presidential approval. Political Research Quarterly, 56(4), 501-512.
23. Hall, A. (1994). Testing for a unit root in time series with pretest data-based model selection. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 12, 461-470.
24. Hansen, S. B. (1999). Life is not fair: Governors' job performance ratings and state economies. Political Research Quarterly, 52, 167-188.
25. Happy, J. R. (1992). The effect of economic and fiscal performance on incumbency voting: the Canadian case. British Journal of Political Science, 22, 117-130.
26. Hetherington, M. J., & Nelson, M. (2003). Anatomy of a rally effect: George W. Bush and the war on terrorism. PS: Political Science and Politics, 36(1), 37-42.
27. Hettich, W., & Winer, S. L. (1984). A positive model of tax structure. Journal of Public Economics, 24, 67-87.
28. Hettich, W., & Winer, S. L. (1988). Economic and political foundations of tax structure. American Economic Review, 78, 701-712.
29. Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (2000). Bread and peace voting in U.S. presidential elections. Public Choice, 104, 149-180.
30. Hibbs, D. A. Jr., & Madsen, H. J. (1981). The impact of economic performance on electoral support in Sweden, 1967-1978. Scandinavian Political Studies, 4, 33-50.
31. Hylleberg, S., Engle, R., Granger, C., & Yoo, B. (1990). Seasonal integration and cointegration. Journal of Econometrics, 44, 215-238.
32. Hymer, S., & Pashigian, P. (1962). Turnover of firms as a measure of market behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics, 44, 82-87.
33. Johnston, P., Lynch, F., & Walker, J. G. (2005). Income taxes and elections in Britain, 1950-2001. Electoral Studies, 24(3), 393-408.
34. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
35. Kelleher, C. A., & Wolak, J. (2005). Citizen confidence in State government institutions. Paper presented at the MPSA National Conference, Chicago.
36. Kone, S. L., & Winters, R. F. (1993). Taxes and voting: electoral retribution in the American states. Journal of Politics, 55, 22-40.
37. Landon, S., & Ryan, D. L. (1997). The political costs of taxes and government spending. Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, 85-111.
38. Lewbel, A. (1997). Constructing instruments for regressions with measurement error when no additional data are available, with an application to patents and R&D. Econometrica, 65, 1201-1213.
39. Lowry, R. C., Alt, J. E., & Ferree, K. E. (1998). Fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in American states. American Political Science Review, 92, 759-774.
40. MacDonald, J. A., & Sigelman, L. (1999). Public assessments of gubernatorial performance. A comparative state analysis. American Politics Quarterly, 27, 201-215.
41. Maddala, G. S., & Kim, I. M. (2004). Unit roots, cointegration and structural change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42. McCaffery, E. J., & Baron, J. (2004). Thinking about tax (Center for the Study of Law and Politics working paper No. 33). California Institute of Technology.
43. Mikesell, J. L. (1978). Election periods and state tax policy cycles. Public Choice, 33, 99-105.
44. Mueller, J. (1970). Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. American Political Science Review, 64, 18-34.
45. Nannestad, P., & Paldam, M. (1994). The VP-function: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years. Public Choice, 79, 213-245.
46. Nannestad, P., & Paldam, M. (1997). The grievance asymmetry revisited: a micro study of economic voting in Denmark, 1986-92. European Journal of Political Economy, 13, 81-99.
47. Nickelsburg, M., & Norpoth, H. (2000). Commander-in-chief or chief economist? The president in the eye of the public. Electoral Studies, 19, 313-332.
48. Nicholson, S. P., Segura, G. M., & Woods, N. D. (2002). Presidential approval and the mixed blessing of divided government. Journal of Politics, 64(4), 701-720.
49. Niemi, R. G., Stanley, H. W., & Vogel, R. J. (1995). State economies and state taxes: do voters hold governors accountable? American Journal of Political Science, 39, 936-957.
50. Niskanen, W. A. (1975). Bureaucrats and politicians, 1975. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 617-643.
51. Niskanen, W. A. (1979). Economic and fiscal effects on the popular vote for the president. In D. Rae & T. Eismeier (Eds.), Public policy and public choice (pp. 93-120). Beverly Hills: Sage.
52. Paldam, M., & Schneider, F. (1980). The macro-economic aspects of government and opposition popularity in Denmark 1957-78. Nationalokonomisk Tidsskrift, 2, 149-170.
53. Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as fiscal conservatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 327-361.
54. Peters, B. G. (1991). The politics of taxation. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
55. Pissarides, C. A. (1980). British government popularity and economic performance. The Economic Journal, 90, 569-581.
56. Pomper, G. M. (1968). Elections in America: control and influence in American politics. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.
57. Powell, G. B., & Whitten, G. D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 391-414.
58. Rose, C. (2000). The I-R hump: irreversible investment under uncertainty. Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 626-636.
59. Rose, R. (1985). Maximizing tax revenue while minimizing political costs. Journal of Public Policy, 5, 289-320.
60. Rose, R., & Karran, T. (1987). Taxation by political inertia. London: Allen & Unwin.
61. Schwert, G. W. (1989). Test for unit roots: a Monte Carlo investigation. Journal of Business and Economics Statistics, 7, 147-159.
62. Smyth, D. J., & Dua, P. (1989). The public's indifference map between inflation and unemployment: empirical evidence for the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies. Public Choice, 60, 71-85.
63. Sobel, R. S. (1998). The political costs of tax increases and expenditure reductions: evidence from state legislative turnover. Public Choice, 96, 61-79.
64. Stults, B. G., & Winters, R. F. (2005). The political economy of taxes and the vote. Unpublished manuscript.
65. Turett, S. (1971). The vulnerability of American governors, 1900-1969. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15, 108-132.
66. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in risk-less choice: a reference-dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.
67. Veiga, F. J., & Veiga, L. G. (2004). The determinants of vote intentions in Portugal. Public Choice, 118, 341-364.
68. Zaller, J. (1998). Monica Lewinsky's contribution to political science. PS: Political Science and Politics, 31, 182-189.