Politicians' opinions on tax reform

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 117-138

  Ashworth, John ^a   Heyndels, Bruno ^b  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034381606     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005044401511     Document Type: Article

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