The shaping of popular satisfaction with government and regime performance in Germany

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 641-672

  Cusack, Thomas R ^a  

^a Science Centre Berlin   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033440896     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123499000319     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. As late as the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994 majorities in both East and West Germany reported that reunification was going worse than they had expected. This disappointment has receded somewhat, but even at the end of 1995, 37 per cent of the East Germans and 43 per cent of those in the West still claimed that reunification had not lived up to their expectations (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, various Politbarometer codebooks and reports).
2. Information on all variables used in the article is provided in the Appendix. Note that a change in the Politbarometer sampling procedures after 1995 reduces the utility of intra-German comparisons. Prior to 1996, the sample size in the West was over a 1,000; it was comparable in the East. The 1996 and 1997 surveys contain a Western sample of over 800, while the Eastern sample is approximately 200.
3. Dieter Fuchs, Giovanna Guidorossi and Palle Svensson, 'Support for the Democratic System', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 323-53.
4. The correlation between the Politbarometer measure that I am using and the Eurobarometer measure, where annual averages are used, is 0.77. There are 18 observations for the West on which this statistic is calculated (1977 to 1994) The correlation between the Politbarometer series and the IPOS series, which is an annual survey conducted in the West from 1984 through 1993 and again in 1995, is 0.93. All three series show that in the period after reunification, i.e., from 1991 on, the average levels of satisfaction are lower than before. In the case of the Politbarometer, average satisfaction dropped from 72.5 to 62.5; for the Eurobarometer it went from 77.4 to 62.7; and IPOS registered a drop from 74.7 to 66.0. The advantage of the Politbarometer series, aside from the fact that it is based on approximately eight different monthly surveys per year, while the other two either come from one annual survey or two semi-annual surveys, is that it also extends through 1997. Note that the Eurobarometer data were provided by Dieter Fuchs (WZB) and an anonymous referee. The IPOS data have been coded from various annual codebooks for the IPOS, Einstellung zu aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik, supplied by the Zentral Archiv für emprische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln.
5. In 1994 74 per cent of West Germans held the view that the Federal Republic's system of democracy was the best form of government available, 15 per cent were undecided, and 9 per cent thought there was a better form. In the East only 31 per cent thought the present form was the best, 41 per cent were undecided and 28 per cent held that there was a better form (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', in Frederick D. Weil and Mary Gautier, eds, Research on Democracy and Society, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1994), pp. 213-31, at p. 215. In addition, the German economy, whose performance reputedly helped build up tremendous satisfaction with, and support for, the Federal Republic's political regime (see David P. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture Revisited (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 212-72), is finding increasingly less favour among citizens of both regions. Thus, in the East it dropped from 77 per cent in 1990 to only 24 per cent in 1996. In 1996 only 45 per cent of Westerners expressed satisfaction with the economic system that they formerly held in high regard (Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', p. 216; and Bolke Behrens, 'Wirtschaft + Politik Umfrage: Mann Gesucht', Wirtschaftswoche, No. 4 (1997), 25-30.
6. In 1994 74 per cent of West Germans held the view that the Federal Republic's system of democracy was the best form of government available, 15 per cent were undecided, and 9 per cent thought there was a better form. In the East only 31 per cent thought the present form was the best, 41 per cent were undecided and 28 per cent held that there was a better form (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', in Frederick D. Weil and Mary Gautier, eds, Research on Democracy and Society, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1994), pp. 213-31, at p. 215. In addition, the German economy, whose performance reputedly helped build up tremendous satisfaction with, and support for, the Federal Republic's political regime (see David P. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture Revisited (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 212-72), is finding increasingly less favour among citizens of both regions. Thus, in the East it dropped from 77 per cent in 1990 to only 24 per cent in 1996. In 1996 only 45 per cent of Westerners expressed satisfaction with the economic system that they formerly held in high regard (Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', p. 216; and Bolke Behrens, 'Wirtschaft + Politik Umfrage: Mann Gesucht', Wirtschaftswoche, No. 4 (1997), 25-30.
7. In 1994 74 per cent of West Germans held the view that the Federal Republic's system of democracy was the best form of government available, 15 per cent were undecided, and 9 per cent thought there was a better form. In the East only 31 per cent thought the present form was the best, 41 per cent were undecided and 28 per cent held that there was a better form (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', in Frederick D. Weil and Mary Gautier, eds, Research on Democracy and Society, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1994), pp. 213-31, at p. 215. In addition, the German economy, whose performance reputedly helped build up tremendous satisfaction with, and support for, the Federal Republic's political regime (see David P. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture Revisited (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 212-72), is finding increasingly less favour among citizens of both regions. Thus, in the East it dropped from 77 per cent in 1990 to only 24 per cent in 1996. In 1996 only 45 per cent of Westerners expressed satisfaction with the economic system that they formerly held in high regard (Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', p. 216; and Bolke Behrens, 'Wirtschaft + Politik Umfrage: Mann Gesucht', Wirtschaftswoche, No. 4 (1997), 25-30.
8. In 1994 74 per cent of West Germans held the view that the Federal Republic's system of democracy was the best form of government available, 15 per cent were undecided, and 9 per cent thought there was a better form. In the East only 31 per cent thought the present form was the best, 41 per cent were undecided and 28 per cent held that there was a better form (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', in Frederick D. Weil and Mary Gautier, eds, Research on Democracy and Society, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1994), pp. 213-31, at p. 215. In addition, the German economy, whose performance reputedly helped build up tremendous satisfaction with, and support for, the Federal Republic's political regime (see David P. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture Revisited (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 212-72), is finding increasingly less favour among citizens of both regions. Thus, in the East it dropped from 77 per cent in 1990 to only 24 per cent in 1996. In 1996 only 45 per cent of Westerners expressed satisfaction with the economic system that they formerly held in high regard (Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', p. 216; and Bolke Behrens, 'Wirtschaft + Politik Umfrage: Mann Gesucht', Wirtschaftswoche, No. 4 (1997), 25-30.
9. See David Easton, 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 435-57.
10. Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton, Beliefs in Government (Oxford: Oxford University, 1995), p. 132.
11. See Dieter Fuchs, 'Trends in Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Abteilung: Institutionen und sozialer Wandel, FS III 92-201 (1992)); and Manfred Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings', in Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart, eds, Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 275-93.
12. See Dieter Fuchs, 'Trends in Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Abteilung: Institutionen und sozialer Wandel, FS III 92-201 (1992)); and Manfred Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings', in Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart, eds, Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 275-93.
13. One might ask whether the measure being used represents a valid indicator for the concept; this is particularly the case with the regime variable. From use alone it would appear to be so; there are nearly twenty studies cited in this article that have used the same or a similar variable to measure this phenomenon. Thus, it would appear that scholars working in this area are in agreement that the 'satisfaction with democracy' question is a well-defined measure of satisfaction with the performance of the (democratic) regime. It measures what it is supposed to measure, satisfaction with regime performance. Where discord arises is when analysts use it to measure support for the regime, be it diffuse, specific or whatever (see Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe'; and Fuchs, 'Trends in Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany').
14. One might ask whether the measure being used represents a valid indicator for the concept; this is particularly the case with the regime variable. From use alone it would appear to be so; there are nearly twenty studies cited in this article that have used the same or a similar variable to measure this phenomenon. Thus, it would appear that scholars working in this area are in agreement that the 'satisfaction with democracy' question is a well-defined measure of satisfaction with the performance of the (democratic) regime. It measures what it is supposed to measure, satisfaction with regime performance. Where discord arises is when analysts use it to measure support for the regime, be it diffuse, specific or whatever (see Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe'; and Fuchs, 'Trends in Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany').
15. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
16. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) as well as Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
17. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) as well as Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
18. Petra Bauer-Kaase and Max Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification: The Germans on the Path to Inner Unity', German Politics, 5 (1996), 1-25, p. 18.
19. Huntington, The Third Wave.
20. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.
21. Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 329-51.
22. Harold D. Clarke, Nitish Dutt and Allan Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 998-1021.
23. Finkel, Muller and Seligson, 'Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support'.
24. See Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'; Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, 'Public Reactions to Economic Performance and Political Support in Contemporary Liberal Democracies', in Harold Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Gary Zuk, eds, Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 253-79; Ulrich Widmaier, Endogene Grenzen des Wachstums (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989); and Ulrich Widmaier, 'Political Stability in OECD Nations', International Political Science Review, 11 (1990), 219-42.
25. See Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'; Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, 'Public Reactions to Economic Performance and Political Support in Contemporary Liberal Democracies', in Harold Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Gary Zuk, eds, Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 253-79; Ulrich Widmaier, Endogene Grenzen des Wachstums (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989); and Ulrich Widmaier, 'Political Stability in OECD Nations', International Political Science Review, 11 (1990), 219-42.
26. See Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'; Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, 'Public Reactions to Economic Performance and Political Support in Contemporary Liberal Democracies', in Harold Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Gary Zuk, eds, Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 253-79; Ulrich Widmaier, Endogene Grenzen des Wachstums (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989); and Ulrich Widmaier, 'Political Stability in OECD Nations', International Political Science Review, 11 (1990), 219-42.
27. See Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'; Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, 'Public Reactions to Economic Performance and Political Support in Contemporary Liberal Democracies', in Harold Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Gary Zuk, eds, Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 253-79; Ulrich Widmaier, Endogene Grenzen des Wachstums (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989); and Ulrich Widmaier, 'Political Stability in OECD Nations', International Political Science Review, 11 (1990), 219-42.
28. Dieter Fuchs and Edeltraud Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe' (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Abteilung: Institutionen und sozialer Wandel, FS III 94-202 (1994)).
29. Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification', p. 19.
30. For a similar approach applied in a much broader setting, see Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis' (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Abteilung: Institutionen und sozialer Wandel, FS III 98-202 (1998)).
31. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1998).
32. Fuchs and Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe'.
33. See, for example, Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', pp. 262-3, and Kendall Baker, Russell J. Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
34. See, for example, Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', pp. 262-3, and Kendall Baker, Russell J. Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
35. Peter H. Merkl, 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values Among Advanced Democratic Countries', in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 19-64, at p. 34, and, for example, Kornberg and Clarke, Citizens and Community, p. 256.
36. Peter H. Merkl, 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values Among Advanced Democratic Countries', in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 19-64, at p. 34, and, for example, Kornberg and Clarke, Citizens and Community, p. 256.
37. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture'; and Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed.
38. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture'; and Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed.
39. Frederick D. Weil, 'The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries Since World War II', American Sociological Review, 54 (1989), 682-706.
40. Oscar W. Gabriel, 'Systemakzeptanz und Wirtschschaftslage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Jürgen W. Falter, Hans Rattinger and Klaus G. Troitzsch, eds, Wahlen und politische Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Neuere Entwicklungen der Forschung (Frankfurt: Verlag Peter Lang, 1989) pp. 196-252.
41. See Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', p. 221; and Frederick D. Weil, 'Western Political Culture and the Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern Germany' (paper presented at the Eighth International Conference on Socio-Economies, Geneva, 1996).
42. See Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR', p. 221; and Frederick D. Weil, 'Western Political Culture and the Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern Germany' (paper presented at the Eighth International Conference on Socio-Economies, Geneva, 1996).
43. Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany', p. 221.
44. Weil, 'Western Political Culture and the Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern Germany', p. 21. For a more differentiated argument, see Manfred G. Schmidt, 'Political Consequences of German Unification', Western European Politics, 15 (1992), 1-15.
45. Weil, 'Western Political Culture and the Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern Germany', p. 21. For a more differentiated argument, see Manfred G. Schmidt, 'Political Consequences of German Unification', Western European Politics, 15 (1992), 1-15.
46. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', p. 263.
47. See the OECD Employment Outlook for 1983 as well as 1994 (Paris: OECD).
48. Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Politics of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'. For a general statement of the position see Merkl, 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values Among Advanced Democratic Countries'. In terms of the East German situation, see Michael Minkenberg, 'The Wall after the Wall: On the Continuing Division of Germany and the Remaking of Political Culture', Comparative Politics, 26 (1993), 53-68.
49. Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Politics of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'. For a general statement of the position see Merkl, 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values Among Advanced Democratic Countries'. In terms of the East German situation, see Michael Minkenberg, 'The Wall after the Wall: On the Continuing Division of Germany and the Remaking of Political Culture', Comparative Politics, 26 (1993), 53-68.
50. Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 'The Politics of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'. For a general statement of the position see Merkl, 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values Among Advanced Democratic Countries'. In terms of the East German situation, see Michael Minkenberg, 'The Wall after the Wall: On the Continuing Division of Germany and the Remaking of Political Culture', Comparative Politics, 26 (1993), 53-68.
51. Kornberg and Clarke, Citizens and Community, pp. 222-5.
52. See Brad Lockerbie, 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 281-93; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 66-81; Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings'; as well as Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification'. On new democracies, see Fuchs and Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe'.
53. See Brad Lockerbie, 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 281-93; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 66-81; Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings'; as well as Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification'. On new democracies, see Fuchs and Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe'.
54. See Brad Lockerbie, 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 281-93; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 66-81; Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings'; as well as Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification'. On new democracies, see Fuchs and Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe'.
55. See Brad Lockerbie, 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 281-93; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 66-81; Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings'; as well as Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification'. On new democracies, see Fuchs and Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe'.
56. See Brad Lockerbie, 'Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 281-93; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 66-81; Kuechler, 'The Dynamics of Mass Political Support in Western Europe: Methodological Problems and Preliminary Findings'; as well as Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 'Five Years of Unification'. On new democracies, see Fuchs and Roller, 'Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe'.
57. See, e.g., Douglas A. Hibbs Jr, The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), and P. Nannestad and M. Paldam, 'The V-P Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years', Public Choice, 79 (1994), 213-45.
58. See, e.g., Douglas A. Hibbs Jr, The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), and P. Nannestad and M. Paldam, 'The V-P Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years', Public Choice, 79 (1994), 213-45.
59. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections; and William R. Keech, Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
60. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections; and William R. Keech, Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
61. Christopher J. Anderson, Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).
62. Note that while income terms are not uncommon in popularity functions, one more frequently sees inflation and unemployment terms. For extensive reviews of this literature, see M. Paldam, 'How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four Decades', in H. Norpoth, M. Lewis-Beck and J-D. Lafay, eds, Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 9-32; and Nannestad and Paldam, 'The V-P Function'. My assessment of the literature of popularity functions in Germany is that the results of such models seem not to be very robust. Further, as I argue later in this article and also show in the empirical analysis, there are some very compelling reasons for including inflation and unemployment in the system satisfaction equation and not in the government satisfaction equation.
63. Note that while income terms are not uncommon in popularity functions, one more frequently sees inflation and unemployment terms. For extensive reviews of this literature, see M. Paldam, 'How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four Decades', in H. Norpoth, M. Lewis-Beck and J-D. Lafay, eds, Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 9-32; and Nannestad and Paldam, 'The V-P Function'. My assessment of the literature of popularity functions in Germany is that the results of such models seem not to be very robust. Further, as I argue later in this article and also show in the empirical analysis, there are some very compelling reasons for including inflation and unemployment in the system satisfaction equation and not in the government satisfaction equation.
64. Anderson, Blaming the Government, pp. 98-9.
65. Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
66. Bruno S. Frey, Modern Political Economy (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978).
67. See Douglas A. Hibbs Jr and Henrik Jess Madsen, 'Public Reactions to the Growth of Taxation and Government Expenditure', World Politics, 32 (1981), 413-35.
68. See B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), as well as Maria Confalonieri and Kenneth Newton, 'Politics, Economics, Class, and Taxation', in Ole Borre and Elinor Scarbrough, eds, The Scope of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 121-48.
69. See B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), as well as Maria Confalonieri and Kenneth Newton, 'Politics, Economics, Class, and Taxation', in Ole Borre and Elinor Scarbrough, eds, The Scope of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 121-48.
70. Anthony Downs, 'Why the Government Budget is too Small in a Democracy', World Politics, 12 (1959), 541-63.
71. Others, too, have explicitly modelled the dynamics of satisfaction with democracy as, in part, a function of unemployment and inflation. See, for example, Clarke et al., 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'; and Kornberg and Clarke, Citizens and Community.
72. Others, too, have explicitly modelled the dynamics of satisfaction with democracy as, in part, a function of unemployment and inflation. See, for example, Clarke et al., 'The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies'; and Kornberg and Clarke, Citizens and Community.
73. Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese Jr, 'Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage-Bargaining, and European Monetary Union' (Centre for European Studies, Harvard University: Discussion Paper, 1996).
74. See Ellen Kennedy, The Bundesbank: Germany's Central Bank in the International Monetary System (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991); as well as Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). For an alternative characterization of the degree of independence enjoyed by the Bundesbank, one which suggests that the degree of independence declines with the level of partisan support for the Federal government found in the upper house, the Bundesrat, see Susanne Lohmann, 'Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92', World Politics, 50 (1998), 401-46.
75. See Ellen Kennedy, The Bundesbank: Germany's Central Bank in the International Monetary System (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991); as well as Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). For an alternative characterization of the degree of independence enjoyed by the Bundesbank, one which suggests that the degree of independence declines with the level of partisan support for the Federal government found in the upper house, the Bundesrat, see Susanne Lohmann, 'Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92', World Politics, 50 (1998), 401-46.
76. See Ellen Kennedy, The Bundesbank: Germany's Central Bank in the International Monetary System (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991); as well as Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). For an alternative characterization of the degree of independence enjoyed by the Bundesbank, one which suggests that the degree of independence declines with the level of partisan support for the Federal government found in the upper house, the Bundesrat, see Susanne Lohmann, 'Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92', World Politics, 50 (1998), 401-46.
77. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck, 'Hat Arbeitlosigkeit den Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus bewirkt?' Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 196 (1981), 1-31.
78. Karl-Heinz Paquè, 'Germany: Living with Tight Corporatism', in J. Hartog and J. Theeuwes, eds, Labour Market Contracts and Institutions: A Cross-National Comparison (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1993), pp. 209-32.
79. It should be pointed out that this tightly co-ordinated system extends to embracing the Bundesbank and its passionate concern for inflation. For more extensive discussion of the complexities of the German national economic institutional framework, see David Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Industrialized Countries', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6/4 (1990), 36-61, as well as Hall and Franzese, 'Mixed Signals'.
80. It should be pointed out that this tightly co-ordinated system extends to embracing the Bundesbank and its passionate concern for inflation. For more extensive discussion of the complexities of the German national economic institutional framework, see David Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Industrialized Countries', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6/4 (1990), 36-61, as well as Hall and Franzese, 'Mixed Signals'.
81. Max Kaase, 'Political Alienation and Protest', in Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies, pp. 114-42, at p. 132.
82. The idea of such a representation is that there is a dynamic equilibrium between a set of independent variables and the dependent variable; because this equilibrium is in flux, and while public opinion is not likely to adjust completely and immediately to exogenous changes, the change in the dependent variable will not come about fully in a single period. In addition, short-term changes are a function not only of an adjustment to any disequilibrium, and partially to recent changes in those variables that define the equilibrium, but are also influenced by exogenous shocks. See, e.g., Nathaniel Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential Approval', in James A. Stimson, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 51-88.
83. The error correction model (ecm) formulation dates at least to A. W. Phillips's papers on feedback control mechanisms for stabilization policy in the 1950s. It became highly popular with Engle and Granger's paper in the late 1980s (R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, 'Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing', Econometrica, 55 (1987), 251-67), which demonstrated its value in dealing with cointegration. Nevertheless, its popularity in dealing with cointegration does not deprive it of utility in dealing with non-cointegrated series (see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 237-47, and John T. Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around', in the same volume, at pp. 229-35). In this context it should be pointed out that the Dickey-Fuller tests on both GSAT and RSAT provide, at best, ambiguous results regarding the hypotheses that these series are non-stationary. However, for the purposes of this article they are treated as stationary. This is justified for the following reasons which themselves draw on arguments made by others (Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration'; Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around'; and Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models'). First, these tests are very biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Secondly, there is no reason to believe nor evidence to substantiate that public opinion series of this type follow a random walk. Thirdly, they are by definition bounded and therefore cannot be explosive. Thus, there is little reason to treat them individually as having unit roots or to expect them to be cointegrated with each other or with any of the exogenous series uses in the analyses below. Ultimately, however, using the one-step procedure for the ecm, even in the presence of cointegration, should produce the same results as the standard two-step procedure put forward by Engle and Granger.
84. The error correction model (ecm) formulation dates at least to A. W. Phillips's papers on feedback control mechanisms for stabilization policy in the 1950s. It became highly popular with Engle and Granger's paper in the late 1980s (R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, 'Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing', Econometrica, 55 (1987), 251-67), which demonstrated its value in dealing with cointegration. Nevertheless, its popularity in dealing with cointegration does not deprive it of utility in dealing with non-cointegrated series (see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 237-47, and John T. Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around', in the same volume, at pp. 229-35). In this context it should be pointed out that the Dickey-Fuller tests on both GSAT and RSAT provide, at best, ambiguous results regarding the hypotheses that these series are non-stationary. However, for the purposes of this article they are treated as stationary. This is justified for the following reasons which themselves draw on arguments made by others (Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration'; Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around'; and Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models'). First, these tests are very biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Secondly, there is no reason to believe nor evidence to substantiate that public opinion series of this type follow a random walk. Thirdly, they are by definition bounded and therefore cannot be explosive. Thus, there is little reason to treat them individually as having unit roots or to expect them to be cointegrated with each other or with any of the exogenous series uses in the analyses below. Ultimately, however, using the one-step procedure for the ecm, even in the presence of cointegration, should produce the same results as the standard two-step procedure put forward by Engle and Granger.
85. The error correction model (ecm) formulation dates at least to A. W. Phillips's papers on feedback control mechanisms for stabilization policy in the 1950s. It became highly popular with Engle and Granger's paper in the late 1980s (R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, 'Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing', Econometrica, 55 (1987), 251-67), which demonstrated its value in dealing with cointegration. Nevertheless, its popularity in dealing with cointegration does not deprive it of utility in dealing with non-cointegrated series (see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 237-47, and John T. Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around', in the same volume, at pp. 229-35). In this context it should be pointed out that the Dickey-Fuller tests on both GSAT and RSAT provide, at best, ambiguous results regarding the hypotheses that these series are non-stationary. However, for the purposes of this article they are treated as stationary. This is justified for the following reasons which themselves draw on arguments made by others (Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration'; Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around'; and Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models'). First, these tests are very biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Secondly, there is no reason to believe nor evidence to substantiate that public opinion series of this type follow a random walk. Thirdly, they are by definition bounded and therefore cannot be explosive. Thus, there is little reason to treat them individually as having unit roots or to expect them to be cointegrated with each other or with any of the exogenous series uses in the analyses below. Ultimately, however, using the one-step procedure for the ecm, even in the presence of cointegration, should produce the same results as the standard two-step procedure put forward by Engle and Granger.
86. The error correction model (ecm) formulation dates at least to A. W. Phillips's papers on feedback control mechanisms for stabilization policy in the 1950s. It became highly popular with Engle and Granger's paper in the late 1980s (R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, 'Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing', Econometrica, 55 (1987), 251-67), which demonstrated its value in dealing with cointegration. Nevertheless, its popularity in dealing with cointegration does not deprive it of utility in dealing with non-cointegrated series (see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 237-47, and John T. Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around', in the same volume, at pp. 229-35). In this context it should be pointed out that the Dickey-Fuller tests on both GSAT and RSAT provide, at best, ambiguous results regarding the hypotheses that these series are non-stationary. However, for the purposes of this article they are treated as stationary. This is justified for the following reasons which themselves draw on arguments made by others (Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration'; Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around'; and Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models'). First, these tests are very biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Secondly, there is no reason to believe nor evidence to substantiate that public opinion series of this type follow a random walk. Thirdly, they are by definition bounded and therefore cannot be explosive. Thus, there is little reason to treat them individually as having unit roots or to expect them to be cointegrated with each other or with any of the exogenous series uses in the analyses below. Ultimately, however, using the one-step procedure for the ecm, even in the presence of cointegration, should produce the same results as the standard two-step procedure put forward by Engle and Granger.
87. The error correction model (ecm) formulation dates at least to A. W. Phillips's papers on feedback control mechanisms for stabilization policy in the 1950s. It became highly popular with Engle and Granger's paper in the late 1980s (R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, 'Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing', Econometrica, 55 (1987), 251-67), which demonstrated its value in dealing with cointegration. Nevertheless, its popularity in dealing with cointegration does not deprive it of utility in dealing with non-cointegrated series (see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 237-47, and John T. Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around', in the same volume, at pp. 229-35). In this context it should be pointed out that the Dickey-Fuller tests on both GSAT and RSAT provide, at best, ambiguous results regarding the hypotheses that these series are non-stationary. However, for the purposes of this article they are treated as stationary. This is justified for the following reasons which themselves draw on arguments made by others (Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration'; Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around'; and Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models'). First, these tests are very biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Secondly, there is no reason to believe nor evidence to substantiate that public opinion series of this type follow a random walk. Thirdly, they are by definition bounded and therefore cannot be explosive. Thus, there is little reason to treat them individually as having unit roots or to expect them to be cointegrated with each other or with any of the exogenous series uses in the analyses below. Ultimately, however, using the one-step procedure for the ecm, even in the presence of cointegration, should produce the same results as the standard two-step procedure put forward by Engle and Granger.
88. The error correction model (ecm) formulation dates at least to A. W. Phillips's papers on feedback control mechanisms for stabilization policy in the 1950s. It became highly popular with Engle and Granger's paper in the late 1980s (R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, 'Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing', Econometrica, 55 (1987), 251-67), which demonstrated its value in dealing with cointegration. Nevertheless, its popularity in dealing with cointegration does not deprive it of utility in dealing with non-cointegrated series (see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', in John R. Freeman, ed., Political Analysis Vol. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 237-47, and John T. Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around', in the same volume, at pp. 229-35). In this context it should be pointed out that the Dickey-Fuller tests on both GSAT and RSAT provide, at best, ambiguous results regarding the hypotheses that these series are non-stationary. However, for the purposes of this article they are treated as stationary. This is justified for the following reasons which themselves draw on arguments made by others (Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration'; Williams, 'What Goes Around Comes Around'; and Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models'). First, these tests are very biased towards accepting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Secondly, there is no reason to believe nor evidence to substantiate that public opinion series of this type follow a random walk. Thirdly, they are by definition bounded and therefore cannot be explosive. Thus, there is little reason to treat them individually as having unit roots or to expect them to be cointegrated with each other or with any of the exogenous series uses in the analyses below. Ultimately, however, using the one-step procedure for the ecm, even in the presence of cointegration, should produce the same results as the standard two-step procedure put forward by Engle and Granger.
89. The data used for this analysis are presented in the Appendix Table A1.
90. The Durbin-Watson statistic for Equation 3a is inconclusive and no corrective procedure was applied.
91. The adjustment term, λ, is sometimes called the error correction term, and is the parameter on the lagged level of the dependent variable in the equation.
92. On the interpretation (and transformation) of the parameters on a lagged exogenous levels variable in terms of its impact on the target or equilibrium level when estimating an ecm with the one-step procedure, see Beck, 'Comparing Dynamic Specifications', pp. 69-73.
93. Cf., Weil, 'The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in Comparative Perspective'; Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR'; and Helmut Wiesenthal, 'Post-Unification Dissatisfaction Or: Why Are So Many East Germans Dissatisfied with West German Political Institutions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996).
94. Cf., Weil, 'The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in Comparative Perspective'; Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR'; and Helmut Wiesenthal, 'Post-Unification Dissatisfaction Or: Why Are So Many East Germans Dissatisfied with West German Political Institutions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996).
95. Cf., Weil, 'The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in Comparative Perspective'; Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany After the Downfall of the GDR'; and Helmut Wiesenthal, 'Post-Unification Dissatisfaction Or: Why Are So Many East Germans Dissatisfied with West German Political Institutions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996).
96. Wendy Carlin and David Soskice, 'Shocks to the System: The German Political Economy Under Stress', National Institute Economic Review, No. 159 (1997), 57-76.
97. These forecasts are contained in the spring report of the six leading German economic research institutes as described in the Financial Times, 23 April 1997, p. 2.
98. Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).