A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1569-1599

  Josephson, Jens ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Evolutionary stability; EWA learning; Fictitious play; Learning in games; Monte Carlo simulation; Reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 41949122499     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.008     Document Type: Article

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