An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 114, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 31-55

  Heller, Dana ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Evolution; Learning; Replicator dynamics; Stochastic environment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346401406     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00117-0     Document Type: Article

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