Committees and special interests

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 219-243

  Felgenhauer, Mike ^a   Peter Grüner, Hans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 40149091266     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00359.x     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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