To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 393-411

  Martimort, David ^a   Pouyet, Jerome ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Bundling unbundling; Capture; Public private partnership

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; OPERATING COSTS; OPTIMIZATION; PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS;

AGENCY COSTS; BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURES; PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP;

SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

EID: 39249083819     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.004     Document Type: Article

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