Renegotiation of concession contracts: A theoretical approach

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 29, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 55-73

  Guasch, J Luis ^a   Laffont, Jean Jacques ^b,c   Straub, Stéphane ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Concession contracts; Regulation; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; PREDICTION; PROBABILITY; REGULATORY APPROACH; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 33750975619     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: 15737160     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-9109-5     Document Type: Conference Paper

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