Enforcement, regulation and development

Journal of African Economies

Volumn 12, Issue SUPPL. 2, 2003, Pages

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION; PROBABILITY; REGULATORY APPROACH;

AFRICA;

EID: 20044391361     PISSN: 09638024     EISSN: 14643723     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (25)

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