Financing the entrepreneurial venture

Management Science

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 151-166

  De Bettignies, Jean Etienne ^a  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Debt versus equity; Entrepreneurial finance; Incomplete contracts

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COSTS; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

DEBT VERSUS EQUITY; ENTREPRENEUR CONTROL; ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE; RIGHT ALLOCATIONS;

INVESTMENTS;

EID: 38849182338     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0759     Document Type: Article

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