When to run and when to hide: Electoral coordination and exit

Economics and Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 80-105

  Indridason, Indridi H ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ICELAND   (Iceland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; MODEL; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY; SOCIAL THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 38649141800     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00315.x     Document Type: Article

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