A new approach for modelling strategic voting in multiparty elections

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 57-75

  Alvarez, R Michael ^b   Nagler, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034424121     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000712340000003X     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-42. For additional and more recent discussion of empirical testing of the 'calculus of voting', see D. P. Green and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); J. H. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 246-78; R. W. Jackman, 'Rationality and Political Participation', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 279-90.
2. W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-42. For additional and more recent discussion of empirical testing of the 'calculus of voting', see D. P. Green and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); J. H. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 246-78; R. W. Jackman, 'Rationality and Political Participation', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 279-90.
3. W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-42. For additional and more recent discussion of empirical testing of the 'calculus of voting', see D. P. Green and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); J. H. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 246-78; R. W. Jackman, 'Rationality and Political Participation', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 279-90.
4. W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-42. For additional and more recent discussion of empirical testing of the 'calculus of voting', see D. P. Green and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994); J. H. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 246-78; R. W. Jackman, 'Rationality and Political Participation', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 279-90.
5. R. D. McKelvey and P. C. Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting', in J. F. Herdon and J. L. Bernd, eds, Mathematical Applications in Political Science VI (Charlottsville: The University of Virginia Press, 1972), pp. 32-78.
6. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
7. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
8. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
9. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
10. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
11. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
12. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
13. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
14. For single-member district plurality systems models, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 608-21; G. W. Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Myerson and R. Weber, 'A Theory of Voting Equilibria', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 856-69; T. Palfrey, 'Spatial Equilibrium with Entry', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984), 139-56. For other models in other types of electoral systems, see G. W. Cox, 'Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts; Approval Voting in Practice?', America Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984), 722-38; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1984); W. E. Gutowski and J. P. Georges, 'Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates', Public Choice, 77 (1993), 225-47; D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; W. G. Ludwin, 'Strategic Voting and the Borda Method', Public Choice, 33 (1978), 85-90.
15. P. R. Abramson, J. H. Aldrich, P. Paolino and D. Rohde, 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 55-69; L. M. Bartels, 'Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns', American Political Science Review, 79 (1988), 804-15. The recent adoption by California of the blanket primary will no doubt spur additional interest in strategic behaviour by primary voters: see E. R. Gerber and R. B. Morton, 'Primary Election Systems and Representation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1998); and R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting' (California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1019, 1997).
16. P. R. Abramson, J. H. Aldrich, P. Paolino and D. Rohde, 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 55-69; L. M. Bartels, 'Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns', American Political Science Review, 79 (1988), 804-15. The recent adoption by California of the blanket primary will no doubt spur additional interest in strategic behaviour by primary voters: see E. R. Gerber and R. B. Morton, 'Primary Election Systems and Representation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1998); and R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting' (California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1019, 1997).
17. P. R. Abramson, J. H. Aldrich, P. Paolino and D. Rohde, 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 55-69; L. M. Bartels, 'Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns', American Political Science Review, 79 (1988), 804-15. The recent adoption by California of the blanket primary will no doubt spur additional interest in strategic behaviour by primary voters: see E. R. Gerber and R. B. Morton, 'Primary Election Systems and Representation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1998); and R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting' (California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1019, 1997).
18. P. R. Abramson, J. H. Aldrich, P. Paolino and D. Rohde, 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 55-69; L. M. Bartels, 'Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns', American Political Science Review, 79 (1988), 804-15. The recent adoption by California of the blanket primary will no doubt spur additional interest in strategic behaviour by primary voters: see E. R. Gerber and R. B. Morton, 'Primary Election Systems and Representation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1998); and R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting' (California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1019, 1997).
19. B. E. Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain', American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978), 639-55; J. Galbraith and N. Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 126-36; A. Heath, J. Curtice, R. Jowell et al., Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 95-128; R. G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-54.
20. B. E. Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain', American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978), 639-55; J. Galbraith and N. Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 126-36; A. Heath, J. Curtice, R. Jowell et al., Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 95-128; R. G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-54.
21. B. E. Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain', American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978), 639-55; J. Galbraith and N. Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 126-36; A. Heath, J. Curtice, R. Jowell et al., Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 95-128; R. G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-54.
22. B. E. Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain', American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978), 639-55; J. Galbraith and N. Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 126-36; A. Heath, J. Curtice, R. Jowell et al., Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 95-128; R. G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-54.
23. B. E. Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain', American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978), 639-55; J. Galbraith and N. Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 126-36; A. Heath, J. Curtice, R. Jowell et al., Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 95-128; R. G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-54.
24. Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting'.
25. R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992: Economics, Issues, and Anger', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), 714-44; R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multicandidate Elections', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 55-96.
26. R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992: Economics, Issues, and Anger', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), 714-44; R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multicandidate Elections', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 55-96.
27. An example of the former is Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain'; examples of the latter are D. Spafford, 'Electoral Systems and Voter's Behavior', Comparative Politics, 5 (1972), 129-34; J. Curtice and M. Steed, 'Appendix 2', in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1987 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988); Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting';
28. An example of the former is Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain'; examples of the latter are D. Spafford, 'Electoral Systems and Voter's Behavior', Comparative Politics, 5 (1972), 129-34; J. Curtice and M. Steed, 'Appendix 2', in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1987 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988); Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting';
29. An example of the former is Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain'; examples of the latter are D. Spafford, 'Electoral Systems and Voter's Behavior', Comparative Politics, 5 (1972), 129-34; J. Curtice and M. Steed, 'Appendix 2', in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1987 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988); Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting';
30. An example of the former is Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain'; examples of the latter are D. Spafford, 'Electoral Systems and Voter's Behavior', Comparative Politics, 5 (1972), 129-34; J. Curtice and M. Steed, 'Appendix 2', in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1987 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988); Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting'; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
31. An example of the former is Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain'; examples of the latter are D. Spafford, 'Electoral Systems and Voter's Behavior', Comparative Politics, 5 (1972), 129-34; J. Curtice and M. Steed, 'Appendix 2', in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1987 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988); Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting'; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
32. See, for example, C. Achen and P. Shively, Cross-level Inference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); G. King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
33. See, for example, C. Achen and P. Shively, Cross-level Inference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); G. King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
34. King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem.
35. A promising technique for analysing aggregate multiparty electoral data which avoids ecological inference problems has recently been advanced in J. N. Katz and G. King, 'A Statistical Model for Multiparty Data' (California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 1005, 1998) While their work to date only allows for strategic entry by candidates, it is clear that their statistical model could be used to study strategic behaviour by voters using aggregated multiparty data.
36. Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics'; G. Evans and A. Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7.
37. Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics'; G. Evans and A. Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7.
38. Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics'; G. Evans and A. Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7.
39. G. C. Wright, 'Misreports of Vote Choice in the 1988 NES Senate Election Study', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 543-63; G. C. Wright, 'Reported Versus Actual Vote - There Is a Difference and It Matters', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17 (1992), 131-42.
40. G. C. Wright, 'Misreports of Vote Choice in the 1988 NES Senate Election Study', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990), 543-63; G. C. Wright, 'Reported Versus Actual Vote - There Is a Difference and It Matters', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17 (1992), 131-42.
41. This assumption seems to run counter to one of the most common uses for feeling thermometers in the electoral studies literature - a measure of party or candidate preferences, and ultimately, voting behaviour (for example, see S. Kelley and T. W. Mirer, 'The Simple Act of Voting', American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 572-91). Feeling thermometers, especially those for political parties, have also been used to measure partisan affiliation, which also seems quite at odds with the use of these survey questions as measures of sincere voting preferences if partisanship is conceptually distinct from voting behaviour (for example, see R. M. Alvarez, 'The Puzzle of Party Identification - Dimensionality of an Important Concept', American Politics Quarterly, 18 (1990), 476-91; H. F. Weisberg, 'A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification', Political Behavior, 2 (1980), 33-66). Given that researchers use these survey questions to measure such diverse concepts clearly calls into question what feeling thermometer questions really measure. This is obviously beyond the scope of this article, but it does lead us to be wary of analyses of strategic voting based on feeling thermometers.
42. This assumption seems to run counter to one of the most common uses for feeling thermometers in the electoral studies literature - a measure of party or candidate preferences, and ultimately, voting behaviour (for example, see S. Kelley and T. W. Mirer, 'The Simple Act of Voting', American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 572-91). Feeling thermometers, especially those for political parties, have also been used to measure partisan affiliation, which also seems quite at odds with the use of these survey questions as measures of sincere voting preferences if partisanship is conceptually distinct from voting behaviour (for example, see R. M. Alvarez, 'The Puzzle of Party Identification - Dimensionality of an Important Concept', American Politics Quarterly, 18 (1990), 476-91; H. F. Weisberg, 'A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification', Political Behavior, 2 (1980), 33-66). Given that researchers use these survey questions to measure such diverse concepts clearly calls into question what feeling thermometer questions really measure. This is obviously beyond the scope of this article, but it does lead us to be wary of analyses of strategic voting based on feeling thermometers.
43. This assumption seems to run counter to one of the most common uses for feeling thermometers in the electoral studies literature - a measure of party or candidate preferences, and ultimately, voting behaviour (for example, see S. Kelley and T. W. Mirer, 'The Simple Act of Voting', American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 572-91). Feeling thermometers, especially those for political parties, have also been used to measure partisan affiliation, which also seems quite at odds with the use of these survey questions as measures of sincere voting preferences if partisanship is conceptually distinct from voting behaviour (for example, see R. M. Alvarez, 'The Puzzle of Party Identification - Dimensionality of an Important Concept', American Politics Quarterly, 18 (1990), 476-91; H. F. Weisberg, 'A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Party Identification', Political Behavior, 2 (1980), 33-66). Given that researchers use these survey questions to measure such diverse concepts clearly calls into question what feeling thermometer questions really measure. This is obviously beyond the scope of this article, but it does lead us to be wary of analyses of strategic voting based on feeling thermometers.
44. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992'; Alvarez and Nagler, 'When Politics and Models Collide'; R. M. Alvarez, S. Bowler and J. Nagler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election' (Unpublished, California Institute of Technology, 1997).
45. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992'; Alvarez and Nagler, 'When Politics and Models Collide'; R. M. Alvarez, S. Bowler and J. Nagler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election' (Unpublished, California Institute of Technology, 1997).
46. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992'; Alvarez and Nagler, 'When Politics and Models Collide'; R. M. Alvarez, S. Bowler and J. Nagler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election' (Unpublished, California Institute of Technology, 1997).
47. Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections'.
48. R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
49. I. Crewe, 'Do Butler and Stokes Really Explain Political Change in Britain?' European Journal of Political Research, 2 (1974), 183-215; I. Crewe, B. Särlvik and J. Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964-1974', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1977), 129-90; B. Särlvik and I. Crewe, Decade of Dealignment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
50. I. Crewe, 'Do Butler and Stokes Really Explain Political Change in Britain?' European Journal of Political Research, 2 (1974), 183-215; I. Crewe, B. Särlvik and J. Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964-1974', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1977), 129-90; B. Särlvik and I. Crewe, Decade of Dealignment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
51. I. Crewe, 'Do Butler and Stokes Really Explain Political Change in Britain?' European Journal of Political Research, 2 (1974), 183-215; I. Crewe, B. Särlvik and J. Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment in Britain, 1964-1974', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1977), 129-90; B. Särlvik and I. Crewe, Decade of Dealignment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
52. By using the distance from the respondents' self-placement to the mean placement of each party - rather than the distance from the respondents' self-placement to the respondents' placement of the party - we avoid contaminating our measure with the tendency of respondents to project their favoured candidates closer to their own ideal issue position. We have also estimated a multinomial probit model using the distance between each respondent's self-placement on each issue and their placement of each party on the issue, with an identical specification of the systematic component of our model discussed in the text. These results are equivalent in all respects to those we present in Table 2: in particular, the estimated values of the coefficients of the strategic terms are -0.76, 0.05, and -0.47, compared to those reported in Table 2 of - 0.8, 0.05, and -0.4. Thus our result is not sensitive to the choice of measures of party placement. The full set of parameter estimates of the alternative specification are available from the authors upon request.
53. J. E. Alt, The Politics of Economic Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); M. S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); D. T. Studlar, I. McAllister and A. Ascui, 'Privatization and the British Electorate: Microeconomic Policies, Macroeconomic Evaluations, and Party Support', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 1077-101.
54. J. E. Alt, The Politics of Economic Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); M. S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); D. T. Studlar, I. McAllister and A. Ascui, 'Privatization and the British Electorate: Microeconomic Policies, Macroeconomic Evaluations, and Party Support', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 1077-101.
55. J. E. Alt, The Politics of Economic Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); M. S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); D. T. Studlar, I. McAllister and A. Ascui, 'Privatization and the British Electorate: Microeconomic Policies, Macroeconomic Evaluations, and Party Support', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 1077-101.
56. I. McAllister and D. T. Studlar, 'Region and Voting in Britain, 1979-87; Territorial Polarization or Artifact?' American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 168-99.
57. Categories 1 through 6 of the occupation variable (as well as military) were coded as blue-collar; for a full listing of the occupation codes, see A. Heath, British General Election Study, 1987: A Computer File (Colchester: ESRC Data Archive, 1989).
58. We have examined alternative operationalizations for the role of class in this election. In particular, we used the Heath-Goldthorpe categorization of individuals into occupation groups (Salariat, Routine nonmanual, Petty bourgeoisie, Foremen and technicians, and Working class; see A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, How Britain Votes (New York: Pergamon, 1985). This alternative specification of class did not add explanatory power to our model, and we do not present those results here. They are available from the authors.
59. See I. Crewe, 'The 1987 General Election', in D. Denver and G. Hands, eds, Issues and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 129-90; McAllister and Studlar, 'Region and Voting in Britain, 1979-87'.
60. See I. Crewe, 'The 1987 General Election', in D. Denver and G. Hands, eds, Issues and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 129-90; McAllister and Studlar, 'Region and Voting in Britain, 1979-87'.
61. See Crewe, 'The 1987 General Election'.
62. The use of such a well-specified model of voter choice does mean that we do have some attrition of survey respondents due to the fact that some respondents did not answer a number of the questions necessary to operationalize all of these variables. We had demographic and vote choice data, but not necessarily data on issue preferences, for over 3,000 survey respondents; we used 2,080 of those in our empirical analysis. However, our sample of 2,080 appears very similar to the larger sample from which our data was drawn: the mean education level in our sample was 16.22 (standard deviation of 2.41), while the full-sample education level was 16.09 (standard deviation of 2.42, sample size of 3,641); the average age in our sample was 45.71 (standard deviation of 16.08) while the full-sample average age level was 46.49 (standard deviation of 17.82; sample size of 3,668); lastly, the average income in our sample was 5.89 on a 1 to 12 scale (standard deviation of 3.04) while the full-sample average family income level was 5.46 (standard deviation of 3.18, sample size of 3,255). We also compared the vote choices of the 2,080 respondents whom we employ in our analysis with the larger sample of 3,695; our sample had 45.2 per cent Conservative voters, 29.6 per cent Labour voters, and 24.2 per cent Alliance voters; the full sample had 37.4 per cent Conservative voters, 25.3 per cent Labour voters and 20 per cent Alliance voters. Our set of 2,080 voters is quite close to the actual breakdown of votes case in this election, since 42.3 per cent of the votes were Conservative, 30.8 per cent were for Labour, and 22.6 per cent were for the Alliance parties. Thus, we are quite confident that our sample of British voters is representative of the population from which they were drawn.
63. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992' and 'When Politics and Models Collide' for a systematic discussion of the multinomial probit model.
64. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992' and 'When Politics and Models Collide' for a systematic discussion of the multinomial probit model.
65. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992' and 'When Politics and Models Collide'.
66. See Alvarez and Nagler, 'Voter Choice in 1992' and 'When Politics and Models Collide'.
67. We also estimate two error correlations. In this analysis the disturbances are assumed to be multivariate normal, with mean zero and covariance matrix ∑. The off-diagonal elements of ∑ give the correlations between pairs of disturbances, assuming that variance of each disturbance is one.
68. For examples of work which makes this strong assumption, see McAllister and Studlar, 'Region and Voting in Britain 1979-87' or M. C. Stewart and H. D. Clarke, 'The (Un) Importance of Party Leaders - Leader Images and Party Choice in the 1987 British Election', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 447-70.
69. For examples of work which makes this strong assumption, see McAllister and Studlar, 'Region and Voting in Britain 1979-87' or M. C. Stewart and H. D. Clarke, 'The (Un) Importance of Party Leaders - Leader Images and Party Choice in the 1987 British Election', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 447-70.
70. These models can also give insight into the dynamics of the possible groupings of choices by British voters. It is quite possible that as party fortunes change, as their positions and general ideologies change, or as they go in and out of control of Parliament, that the similarities voters see between the parties may change as well.
71. Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections'.
72. Niemi et al. 'Constituency Characteristics' ; Evans and Heath, 'A Tactical Error'; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
73. Niemi et al. 'Constituency Characteristics' ; Evans and Heath, 'A Tactical Error'; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
74. Niemi et al. 'Constituency Characteristics' ; Evans and Heath, 'A Tactical Error'; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
75. Evans and Heath, 'A Tactical Error'; Johnston and Pattie, Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
76. Evans and Heath, 'A Tactical Error'; Johnston and Pattie, Tactical Voting in Great Britain'.
77. For example, Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics'.
78. For estimates in the low range, see Evans and Heath 'A Tactical Error'; Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain';
79. For estimates in the low range, see Evans and Heath 'A Tactical Error'; Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain';
80. For estimates in the low range, see Evans and Heath 'A Tactical Error'; Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain';
81. in the moderate range, see Galbraith and Rae, 'A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting';
82. and for those in the high range, see Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics'.