From guns to briefcases: The evolution of Russian organized crime

World Policy Journal

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 68-74

  Sokolov, Vsevolod ^a  

^a Center for Defense Information   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2642514202     PISSN: 07402775     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/07402775-2004-2013     Document Type: Review

References (10)

1. See, for example, Andrei Konstantinov, Banditskii Peterburg (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1995); Andrei Konstantinov and Malcolm Dixelius, Banditskaya Rossiya (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1997); Nikolai Modestov, Moskva Banditskaya (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001); Andrei Konstantinov, Banditsky Peterburg 1703-2003: Itogi Epokhi (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2004),
2. See, for example, Andrei Konstantinov, Banditskii Peterburg (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1995); Andrei Konstantinov and Malcolm Dixelius, Banditskaya Rossiya (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1997); Nikolai Modestov, Moskva Banditskaya (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001); Andrei Konstantinov, Banditsky Peterburg 1703-2003: Itogi Epokhi (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2004),
3. See, for example, Andrei Konstantinov, Banditskii Peterburg (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1995); Andrei Konstantinov and Malcolm Dixelius, Banditskaya Rossiya (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1997); Nikolai Modestov, Moskva Banditskaya (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001); Andrei Konstantinov, Banditsky Peterburg 1703-2003: Itogi Epokhi (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2004),
4. See, for example, Andrei Konstantinov, Banditskii Peterburg (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1995); Andrei Konstantinov and Malcolm Dixelius, Banditskaya Rossiya (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 1997); Nikolai Modestov, Moskva Banditskaya (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001); Andrei Konstantinov, Banditsky Peterburg 1703-2003: Itogi Epokhi (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2004),
5. For economic analyses of Russian organized crime and private protection enforcement, see Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). Criminologists Anton Block and Diego Gambetta have shown that a similar demand for private protection resulted in the growth of organized crime in Italy. See Anton Block, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
6. For economic analyses of Russian organized crime and private protection enforcement, see Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). Criminologists Anton Block and Diego Gambetta have shown that a similar demand for private protection resulted in the growth of organized crime in Italy. See Anton Block, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
7. For economic analyses of Russian organized crime and private protection enforcement, see Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). Criminologists Anton Block and Diego Gambetta have shown that a similar demand for private protection resulted in the growth of organized crime in Italy. See Anton Block, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
8. For economic analyses of Russian organized crime and private protection enforcement, see Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). Criminologists Anton Block and Diego Gambetta have shown that a similar demand for private protection resulted in the growth of organized crime in Italy. See Anton Block, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
9. Argumenti I fakti, "Vstrecha ne sostoyalas'," Artem Kostyukovsky, August 22, 2003, http://www.aif.ru/online/spb/522/04.
10. To make the distinction between corruption and organized crime clear: corruption implies an illicit pact with the state. Organized crime, at least in its "pure" form, operates outside of the state because it is powerful enough to avoid making alliances. In reality, organized crime rarely achieves that level of power, and there is almost always a need to bribe or co-opt agents of the state, resulting in a frequent overlap between these phenomena. The fact that criminal entities now enter into more contracts with state entities than in the 1990s indicates the growing power of the state relative to other protection agents.