메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 247-263

Curtailing ex-post fraud in risk sharing arrangements

Author keywords

Ex post fraud; Risk sharing

Indexed keywords


EID: 3843054696     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024124527333     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (4)

References (16)
  • 1
    • 0000798986 scopus 로고
    • Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: Should the penalty fit the crime?
    • Andreoni, J. (1991). "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?" RAND Journal of Economics. 22(3), 385-395.
    • (1991) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.22 , Issue.3 , pp. 385-395
    • Andreoni, J.1
  • 3
    • 0003509657 scopus 로고
    • Aspects of the theory of risk bearing
    • Chicago: Markham
    • Arrow, K. (1971). "Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing." In Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Chicago: Markham.
    • (1971) Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing
    • Arrow, K.1
  • 4
    • 0042460592 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Modelling different types of automobile insurance fraud behaviour in the Spanish market
    • Artis, M., Ayuso, M. & Guillén, M. (1999). "Modelling Different Types of Automobile Insurance Fraud Behaviour in the Spanish Market." Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. 24, 67-81.
    • (1999) Insurance: Mathematics and Economics , vol.24 , pp. 67-81
    • Artis, M.1    Ayuso, M.2    Guillén, M.3
  • 5
    • 0001152529 scopus 로고
    • Regulation, asymmetric information and auditing
    • Baron, D. & Besanko, D. (1982). "Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Auditing." RAND Journal of Economics. 15, 447-470.
    • (1982) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.15 , pp. 447-470
    • Baron, D.1    Besanko, D.2
  • 6
    • 0030642378 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs
    • Bond, E. & Crocker, K. (1997). "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs." Journal of Public Economics. 63, 239-264.
    • (1997) Journal of Public Economics , vol.63 , pp. 239-264
    • Bond, E.1    Crocker, K.2
  • 7
    • 0000733471 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Is honesty the best policy? Curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts
    • Crocker, K. & Morgan, J. (1998). "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud Through Optimal Incentive Contracts." Journal of Political Economy. 106, 355-375.
    • (1998) Journal of Political Economy , vol.106 , pp. 355-375
    • Crocker, K.1    Morgan, J.2
  • 8
    • 0040516623 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Insurance fraud estimation: More evidence from the Quebec automobile insurance industry
    • Caron, L. & Dionne, G. (1997). "Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the Quebec Automobile Insurance Industry." Assurances. 64, 567-578.
    • (1997) Assurances , vol.64 , pp. 567-578
    • Caron, L.1    Dionne, G.2
  • 10
    • 84934349253 scopus 로고
    • Optimal contracts under costly state falsification
    • Lacker, J. & Weinberg, J. (1989). "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification." Journal of Political Economy. 97, 1345-1363.
    • (1989) Journal of Political Economy , vol.97 , pp. 1345-1363
    • Lacker, J.1    Weinberg, J.2
  • 11
    • 84959809571 scopus 로고
    • Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution
    • Mookherjee, D. & P'ng, I. (1989). "Optimal Auditing, Insurance and Redistribution." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 103, 399-415.
    • (1989) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.103 , pp. 399-415
    • Mookherjee, D.1    P'ng, I.2
  • 12
    • 0030514774 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue
    • Picard, P. (1996). "Auditing Claims in the Insurance Market with Fraud: The Credibility Issue." Journal of Public Economics. 63, 27-56.
    • (1996) Journal of Public Economics , vol.63 , pp. 27-56
    • Picard, P.1
  • 13
    • 3843145637 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud
    • G. Dionne (ed.). Kluwer Academic Publishers
    • Picard, P. (2000). "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud." In G. Dionne (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Insurance. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    • (2000) Handbook of the Economics of Insurance
    • Picard, P.1
  • 14
    • 3843078056 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Presentation to the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists, University of Vienna
    • Snow, A. (1998). "On the Optimality of Simple Deductible Insurance Contracts." Presentation to the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists, University of Vienna.
    • (1998) On the Optimality of Simple Deductible Insurance Contracts
    • Snow, A.1
  • 15
    • 0000975826 scopus 로고
    • The optimal enforcement of laws
    • Stigler, G. (1970). "The Optimal Enforcement of Laws." Journal of Political Economy. 78, 526-536.
    • (1970) Journal of Political Economy , vol.78 , pp. 526-536
    • Stigler, G.1
  • 16
    • 0009424011 scopus 로고
    • Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
    • Townsend, R. (1979). "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification." Journal of Economic Theory. 21, 265-293.
    • (1979) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.21 , pp. 265-293
    • Townsend, R.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.