Risk sharing and quasi-credit

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 257-278

  Fafchamps, Marcel ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

01; D1

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS;

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; CREDIT PROVISION; RISK FACTOR; RURAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0032750573     PISSN: 09638199     EISSN: 14699559     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09638199900000016     Document Type: Article

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