The evolution of trust in non-simultaneous exchange situations

Rationality and Society

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 85-113

  Bravo, Giangiacomo ^a   Tamburino, Lucia ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolutionary algorithm; Reciprocity; Reputation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 38349133940     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: 14617358     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1043463107085441     Document Type: Article

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