Can corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? An empirical analysis

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 225-251

  Fich, Eliezer M ^a   Slezak, Steve L ^b  

^a DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

Bankruptcy; Corporate governance; Financial distress

Indexed keywords

EID: 38149070196     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-007-0048-5     Document Type: Article

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