Persuasion and the contexts of dissuasion: Causal models and informal arguments

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 28-59

  Green, David W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849041736     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546780701527690     Document Type: Article

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