Mental simulation and argument

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 31-61

  Green, David W ^a   Applebaum, Ronit ^a   Tong, Simon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144459296     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1049/ip-cdt:20045120     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Bell, D. E. (1982). Regret in decision-making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 30, 961-981.
2. Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Carroll, J. S. (1978). The effect of imagining an event on expectations for the event: An interpretation in terms of the availability heuristic. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 88-96.
4. Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error; Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Avon.
5. Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454-459.
6. Evans, J. St. B. T. (in press). The social and communicative function of conditional statements. Mind and Society.
7. Evans, J. St. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11, 295-306.
8. Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J., & Harper, C. N. J. (2000). Necessity, possibility and belief: A study of syllogistic reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54A, 935-958.
9. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove, UK: Psychology Press
10. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Finucane, M L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 1-17.
12. Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Counterfactuals as behavioural primes: Priming the simulation heuristic and consideration of alternatives. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 384-409.
13. Girotto, V., Legrenzi, P., & Rizzo, A. (1991). Event controllability in counterfactual thinking. Acta Psychologica, 78, 111-113.
14. Green, D. W. (1996a). Models, arguments and decisions. In J. Oakhill & A. Garnham (Eds.), Mental models in cognitive science: A festschrift for Philip Johnson-Laird (pp. 119-137). Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd.
15. Green, D. W. (1996b). Inferring health claims: A case study. Forensic Linguistics, 3, 299321.
16. Green, D. W. (2000). Argument and opinion. In J. Garcia-Madruga, N. Carriedo, & M. J. González-Labra (Eds.), Mental models in reasoning (pp. 57-67). Madrid: UNED.
17. Green, D. W. (2001). A mental model theory of argument. In Workshop on the mental models theory of reasoning: Refinements and extensions, Brussels, March 23-24.
18. Green, D. W. (2005). Affect and argument. In V. Girotto & P. N. Johnson-Laird (Eds.), The shape of reason (pp. 180-191). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
19. Green, D. W., McClelland, A., Muckli, L., & Simmons, C. (1999). Arguments and deontic decisions. Acta Psychologica, 101, 27-47.
20. Green, D. W., & McCloy, R. (2003). Reaching a verdict. Thinking & Reasoning, 9, 307-333.
21. Green, D. W., & McManus, I. C. (1995). Cognitive structural models: Perception of risk and prevention in coronary heart disease. British Journal of Psychology, 86, 321-336.
22. Green, D. W., Munccr, S. J., Heffernan, T., & McManus, I. C. (2003). Eliciting and representing the causal understanding of a social concept: A methodological and statistical comparison of two methods. Papers on social representations. Textes sur les ReprÕsentations Sociales, 12, 2.1-2.23. [http://www.psr.jku.at/]
23. Greenwald, A., Pickrell, J. E., & Farnham, S. D. (2002). Implicit partisanship: Taking sides for no reason. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 367-379.
24. Hetts, J. J., Boninger, D. S., Armor, D. A., Gleicher, F., & Nathanson, A. (2000). The influence of anticipated counterfactual regret on behavior. Psychology & Marketing, 17, 345-368.
25. Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice and commitment. New York: The Free Press.
26. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd.
27. Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.
28. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgements under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 201-208). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29. Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., & Namer, B. (2000). On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review, 107, 852-884.
30. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31. Lipshitz, R. (1993). Decision-making as argument-driven action. In G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu, & R. Calderwood, Decision-making in action: Models and methods (pp. 172-181). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.
32. Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805-824.
33. Lowenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267-286.
34. Maia, T. V., & McClelland, J. L. (2004). A re-examination of the evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis: What participants really know in the Iowa gambling task. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101, 16075-16080.
35. McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Semifactual "Even If Thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 8, 41-67.
36. Osman, M. (2004). An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 988-1010.
37. Over, D. E. (2004). The psychology of the conditional. In K. Manktelow & M. C. Chung (Eds.), Psychology of reasoning: Theoretical and historical perspectives (pp. 75-94). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
38. Richard, R., de Vries, N. K., & van der Pligt, J. (1998). Anticipated regret and precautionary sexual behaviour. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 1411-1428.
39. Rios, S. M., Madruga, J. A., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2001). The effects of linguistic mood on if: Semifactual and counterfactual conditionals. [Cited in McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Semifactual "even if thinking. Thinking and Reasoning, 8, 41-67.]
40. Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 133-148.
41. Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513-523.
42. Shafir, E., Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1993). Reason-based choice. Cognition, 49, 11-36.
43. Sloman, S.A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22.
44. Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D.G. (2002). The affect heuristic. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (Eds.), Intuitive judgment: Heuristics and biases (pp. 397-420). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
45. Stanovich, K., E., & West, R. F. (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 342- 357.
46. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2003). Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality. In D. Over (Ed.), Evolution and the psychology of thinking (pp. 171-230). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
47. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
48. Voss, J., & Means, M. (1991). Learning to reason via instruction in argumentation. Learning and Instruction, 1, 337-350.
49. Vygotsky, L. (1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. In J. Wertsch (Ed.), The concept of activity in social psychology (pp. 144- 188). Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
50. Walton, D. N. (1989). Dialogue theory for critical thinking. Argumentation, 3, 169-184.
51. Weinstock, M., Neuman, Y., & Tabak, I. (2004). Missing the point or missing the norms? Epistemological norms as predictors of students' ability to identify fallacious arguments. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29, 77-94.
52. Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D. J., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & La Fleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339.